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Abstract 
ــــــــــــ 
This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the CBE. 
The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily 
represent those of the CBE or CBE policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the 
author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate. 
 
The main objective of the paper in hand is to examine the validity of using Taylor rule as a 
robust rule for conducting monetary policy in case of Egypt. In this context, the paper 
works through two main pillars. First: parts two and three; critically analyze the theoretical 
grounds for using an interest rate rule in conducting monetary policy. Second: part four; 
emphasize how the Taylor rule can be empirically estimated and evaluated. Consistently; 
this exercised while estimating and evaluating both simple backward and forward-looking 
Taylor rule for Egypt, guided by lessons from selected countries` experiences in estimating 
Taylor rule like U.S.A., U.K and Chile. 
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 I. Introduction 
“The predominant weight of the existing evidence suggests that the effects of 
monetary policy on real economic activity are systematic, significant, and sizeable. Yet 
questions remain, both about individual empirical results and, more broadly, about the 
different methodological approaches that researchers have used to investigate these 
effects” Friedman (1995). 
 
The quantity theory of money has overwhelmed the theory and practice of monetary 
policy for long, implying a long existing perception of monetary policy as a passive 
instrument in real economic activity, and central banks as merely institutional means of 
stabilizing monetary targets, denying the potential influence of central banks on real 
economic growth.  
 
However, the increasing dominance of New Keynesian literature in recent decades 
subverts the orthodox view of monetary policy by building down the “Fisherian” 
assumptions on price and wage flexibility. The New Keynesian framework with prices or/ 
and wages rigidity, known as Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) Models, 
creates a channel for monetary policy to affect real macroeconomic variables through 
systematic policy actions using a monetary policy rule. 
 
Although the significance of setting transparent policy rules through which central 
banks can manage market expectations was highlighted by Lucas and Sargent (1981). 
Nevertheless, the revival of academic and policy interest in “policy rules” was brought 
about with the introduction of John Taylor’s monetary policy reaction function known as 
“Taylor rule” in his famous "Discretion versus policy rules in practice" (1993), following 
closely the observed path of the U.S. short-term interest (Fed Fund rate) rate in the late 
1980s through early 1990s. Taylor demonstrated that a simple reaction function (Taylor 
Rule) can respond to movements in fundamental variables (inflation and output gap) using 
a simple policy instrument (a short-term interest rate). Latterly, numerous modifications 
have been introduced to “Taylor’s Rule” (Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 2000; et al), with 
specific applications to the US economy and other countries.  
 
Nevertheless, a particular gap in existent economic literature lies in disregarding the 
importance of studying the scope of applying monetary policy rules to various country 
groups; whether policy rules are fit for application in all countries or whether they are case-
specific to certain economies, and if found adequately general for application in all central 
banks, what are the specified measures to adapting such rules to specific country cases. 
 
In case of Egypt, economic literature is devoid of any explicit detailed attempt to 
construct a simple monetary policy rule for the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE). Adopting an 
 5
interest rate rule was merely addressed in an implicit fashion, without explicit emphasis on 
both the theoretical rationale for using Taylor rule for monetary policy conduct, and how 
this rule can be empirically evaluated (Moursi, El Mossallamy and Zakareya, 2007). The 
thesis at hand is the first attempt to study these issues explicitly, whether theoretically or 
empirically. Hence, the purpose of this paper is to examine the validity of using an interest 
rate policy rule, specifically the Taylor rule, as a robust rule for conducting monetary 
policy in case of Egypt.  
 
The time frame of the study at hand covers the period extending from January 1997 
to December 2007 (on a monthly basis). This period experienced two key events for the 
central bank of Egypt; first: floatation of the Egyptian pound at the end of January 2003. 
The high inflation rates that came about in the aftermath of the floatation of the Egyptian 
pound seemingly encouraged the CBE to advocate price stability and low inflation rates 
(along with banking system soundness) as the main monetary objective1. Second: 
managing the short-term interest rate as an operational target for conducting the monetary 
policy in June 20052, instead of excess reserves. This action was taken as a prerequisite 
infrastructure for adapting an inflation-targeting regime, where the new system of policy 
management is based on conventional macroeconomic theorization, which predicts that it 
would be possible to stabilize output, prices and control inflationary pressures via 
monetary tightening. In practice, there are no assurances that the actual results obtained 
from a monetary contraction would match the theorized facts. In particular instances, an 
increase in interest rate could, in special circumstances, lead to a rise in the price and/or 
output levels3.  
 
Such mysteries are likely to expose the effectiveness of the CBE monetary policy 
and its capacity to check inflation and achieve the price stabilization objective. 
Consequently, an analytical need revealed for understanding the dynamic behavior of 
prices and output in response to different monetary policy shocks. Discerning the structure 
of those responses should also be useful to investigate the prospects of pursuing a 
monetary policymaking framework based on a formal inflation-targeting approach as 
proposed recently by the CBE (CBE 2004/2005). 
                                                
1 The importance of realizing price stability as an intervening principal objective of monetary policy was further emphasized by 
the recent structural reforms, which encompassed the establishment of the Coordinating Council, under the leadership of the 
Prime Minister, in January 2005 and the Monetary Policy Committee affiliated to the CBE Board of Directors in mid-2005. 
2 To manage the interest rates (including the overnight interbank rate) and implement its monetary policy, the CBE established 
a new operational framework early in June 2005, known as the corridor system, with a ceiling and a floor for the overnight 
interest rates on lending from and deposits at the CBE, respectively. 
3 Only in case of inequality of income distribution, where liquidity is unfairly distributed among different sectors of the 
economy. 
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II. Types of Monetary Policy Implementation 
Part two through three: the paper critically analyzes the theoretical ground for using and 
estimating an interest rate rule for conducting monetary policy. So, it begins with exploring 
the foundation of the interest rate rules and its monetary policy implementation 
alternatives. This is in addition to reviewing the advantages and disadvantages of each 
alternative.  
 
The paper, then, highlights the role of the interest rate rules in satisfying the monetary 
policy goals. Finally, it discusses Taylor (2001) central bank reaction function in case of 
both closed and open economy, and the significance of the exchange rate in the open 
economy central bank reaction function. 
 
A- Types of Monetary Policy Implementation: Rules versus Discretion 
An extensive literature addresses the question of whether it is preferable to implement 
monetary policy by a rule or by discretion. This question has traditionally been referred to 
as the issue of rules versus discretion (Federal Reserve Board, 2002).  
 
In a strict interpretation of a rules-based regime; policymakers commit to how they will 
adjust their policy instrument, in response to incoming data or to changes in the forecast. 
Once this rule is specified, their judgment no longer is relevant to the policy outcomes. On 
the other side, in a discretionary regime, policymakers do not commit in advance to a 
specific course of action, but instead they apply their judgment, deciding on each occasion 
what policy is appropriate.  
 
A strict rules-based policy establishes an unequivocal commitment by policymakers to 
achieve their policy objectives, especially meeting their inflation objective. Such a 
commitment, in turn, increases the transparency and accountability of monetary policy and 
thereby helps to pin down inflation expectations. In principle, the resulting credibility 
about policymakers' commitment to price stability could reduce the cost of disinflation, if 
inflation were to rise above the objective, and could reduce the spillover of supply shocks-
that is autonomous shocks to the price level-into broader price movements. 
 
Even if we cannot imagine policymakers turning over the conduct of policy to a rule, 
research on rules might provide guidance to policymakers that could improve their 
judgmental adjustments to policy. In turn, good discretionary policy therefore should be, in 
some meaningful way, rule-like, though it might be impossible to write down in a simple 
or even complicated equation all the complex considerations that underpin the conduct of 
such a systematic monetary policy.  
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In this spirit, in 1993, John Taylor a systematic monetary policy informed by policy rules 
but flexible enough to adapt to structural changes and other real-world complexities. This 
was in many economists` view, the best direction for monetary policy. This regime based 
on complementarity between rules and discretion was encouraged by John Taylor was 
widely discussed. It provides the advantage of the both the rules based and discretionary 
monetary policy, where it shows that the usage of the rules should be as a good guidance to 
policymakers which could improve their judgmental adjustments to policy. 
 
B- The role of monetary policy rules in satisfying the goals of monetary policy 
The time inconsistency literature argues4 that a purely discretionary policy setting leads to 
higher long-run inflation (Kydland and Prescott 1977, and Barro and Gordon 1983). In 
such circumstances, a credible commitment by the central bank to maintain price stability 
can reduce the inflation bias from monetary policy. In the past, such a commitment was 
often imposed externally by a fixed exchange rate, or internally by a monetary growth 
target. However, in the meantime, both approaches have lost their importance: the former 
has proved to be unsustainable in the face of growing capital flows and financial markets’ 
imperfections, and the latter has failed because of large-scale shocks to money demand 
functions. 
 
Against this backdrop, a recent and growing body of literature has argued that inflation 
targeting provides a convenient mechanism for central banks to combine rules and 
discretion in conducting monetary policy. For example, Svensson (1999) describes 
inflation targeting as “decision making under discretion” where central banks follow what 
he calls a “targeting rule” by which they set interest rates to reduce the deviation between 
the conditional inflation forecast (the “intermediate target” of policy) and the inflation 
target to zero over the target horizon5. In this setting, the central bank is not committed to 
any particular instrument arrangement and therefore gains considerable flexibility in 
setting its interest rate. The typical process involves the central bank revising its inflation 
and output forecast in each period (corresponding to the frequency of the monetary policy 
committee meetings) based on the information available to it at that time. If the conditional 
inflation forecast is higher than the target, the central bank will increase the interest rate to 
minimize such deviations by the end of the targeting horizon, and vice versa. The private 
sector then decides its consumption and investment plans based on the central bank’s 
reaction. Blinder (1998) calls this “enlightened discretion” and argues that it is close to 
what many policymakers try to do in practice6. 
                                                
4 As discussed in the above section. 
5 Similarly, Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) characterize inflation targeting as a framework under which policymakers exercise 
“constrained discretion”. According to White (2002), an important practical benefit of rules in monetary policy is that they can 
constrain the behavior of central banks and promote transparency. 
6 This is also clear from Taylor (1993, 2002), who defines rules as the systematic response of the central bank to inflation and 
output deviations and not a fixed setting for monetary policy. 
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The need for greater monetary discipline in emerging market economies has been generally 
stressed against the backdrop of their relatively high inflation and low policy credibility. In 
a recent paper Calvo and Mishkin (2003) discuss why emerging market economies are 
vulnerable to “sudden stops” of capital inflows and repeated exchange rate collapses. 
Attributing financial crises in emerging market economies to their weak institutional 
credibility, they suggest that central banks in these economies should be subject to 
“constrained discretion” through inflation targeting, making it harder for them to follow an 
“overly expansionary monetary policy”. To the extent that this leads to a more transparent 
and accountable instrument setting behavior by the central bank, it can pin down investors’ 
confidence and reduce vulnerability to crisis. 
 
Taylor (2002) provides another reason for adopting a rule-based monetary policy in 
emerging economies. He argues that anticipation effects of monetary policy are higher 
when the central bank follows a systematic approach in setting interest rates. Given their 
less developed financial markets, such effects are likely to be lower in emerging 
economies. Yet monetary policy could still have significant impacts through movements of 
wages and property prices. More predictable central bank behavior is therefore expected to 
improve the transmission and effectiveness of monetary policy. Indeed, over the last 
decade of the 20th. century, the conduct of monetary policy in emerging market economies 
has increasingly moved in this direction.  
C- The central banks` reaction function: 
Given the above discussion, there are reasons to believe that central banks’ reaction 
function-especially in emerging market economies-needs to consider their multiple 
objective setting.  
 
The equations stated below summarize the standard aggregate model where the central 
bank sets the interest rate according to both the inflation and the output gap as follows 
(Taylor 1999): 
 
1- In case of closed economy: 
…………… (1) 
………….... (2) 
…………….(3) 
where: y, i, π and r are the output gap, the central bank policy rate, the inflation rate, and the long-run 
equilibrium real interest rate respectively. β, α are slope parameters and u & e are stochastic disturbance 
terms. 
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Equations (1) and (2) are the closed economy aggregate demand and supply equations 
(backward-looking Phillips curve). 
Equation (3): defines the policy rule, whereby the central bank changes its policy rate 
according to the current period inflationary and output gap, given the policy parameters δ0, 
δ1, and δ2. 
 
A crucial condition for the stability of this model is that the reaction coefficient on inflation 
(δ1) should be above unity7. The aggregate demand function is then negatively sloped with 
respect to the inflation rate. Faced with a price shock (e) the central bank increases its 
interest rate by more than the rise in inflation, which raises real interest rates until inflation 
returns to the target. 
 
Given the underlying Phillips curve relationship in (2), the coefficient on the output gap 
(δ2) in the reaction function depends on two factors: the slope of the aggregate supply 
curve and the weight given to the variability of output in the loss function. For instance, a 
flat supply curve implies that a policy shock to reduce inflation will significantly increase 
output variability, suggesting, ceteris paribus, a relatively small coefficient. 
 
Moreover, a standard practice followed by many researchers is to include a lagged interest 
rate term in the reaction function (3), reflecting the desire of central banks to smooth 
interest rate changes. The economic rationale behind such smoothing has been well 
documented in the literature8. Moving the policy rate by small steps in the same direction 
increases its impact on the long-term interest rate because market participants expect the 
change to continue and hence price their expectations into forward rates. Acting gradually 
also reduces the risk of policy mistakes, when uncertainty about model parameters is high 
and policymakers have to act on partial information.  
 
Another reason is that central banks may care about the implications of their actions for the 
financial system: if markets have limited capacity to hedge interest rate risk, a sudden and 
large change in the interest rate could expose market participants to capital losses and 
might raise systemic financial risks.  
 
Other reasons could include avoiding reputation risks to central banks from sudden 
reversals of interest rate directions. 
 
                                                
7 Substituting equation (3) into equation (1) gives the slope of the aggregate demand function as 
 -β(δ1 - 1)/(1+ β δ2). Hence the stability of the policy rule requires that δ1 >1. 
 
8 For recent reviews see Lowe and Ellis (1997), and Sack and Wieland (1999). 
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2- In case of open economy: The monetary policy reaction to the exchange rate 
The exchange rate is the key variable while speaking about the monetary policy reaction 
function in the context of open economies. Particularly, when the exchange rate pass-
through into prices is very high, this key variable is likely to assume a special importance 
for the monetary policy. 
 
Focusing upon an open economy interest rate reaction function, the central bank reacts to 
the actual inflation rate, output gap, and the changes in the exchange rate in the following 
way (Taylor (2001): 
 
…………… (1) 
………….... (2) 
……………. (4) 
 
where: y, i, π, xr and r are the output gap, the central bank policy rate, the inflation rate, the log level of 
the real effective exchange rate, and the long-run equilibrium real interest rate respectively. β, α, δ are 
slope parameters and u & e are stochastic disturbance terms. ∆ is the first difference operator.  
 
Reasons behind adding the exchange rate to the interest rate reaction function in case 
of open economy: 
A familiar argument, pioneered by Taylor (2001), is that if the exchange rate depreciates 
due to a temporary disturbance, the interest rate should remain unchanged (first row of 
Table A below). This is because such exchange rate movements do not have much effect 
on expectations of inflation, and a central bank that reacts to inflation will indirectly take 
into account the consequences of the exchange rate movement for its policy9. If the 
depreciation is due to a decline in the demand for exports, the central bank faces a positive 
price shock as well as a negative demand shock, making an interest rate increase less 
necessary.  
 
Attempts to reduce exchange rate volatility might also increase output volatility; Ball 
(1999) shows that, in such circumstances, targeting a long-run inflation rate that excludes 
exchange rate effects is more helpful. This may increase the short-run inflation volatility, 
but will greatly reduce output variability. 
 
                                                
9 Mishkin and Savastano (2001) argue that reacting “too heavily and frequently” to exchange rate movements raises the risk 
that the exchange rate might become the de facto anchor for monetary policy. 
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Table 1 
A Simple Matrix of Monetary Policy Reaction to the Exchange Rate 
 Real Shock Financial Shock 
Temporary Shock No reaction No reaction 
Permanent Shock Fiscal policy Monetary policy 
Source: derived by the author. 
 
Another case theoretically meriting no monetary response, is a depreciation caused by a 
permanent real shock; for instance, a secular decline in the terms-of-trade or a negative 
productivity shock. A first best policy may be to adjust other policies, in particular fiscal 
policy to align the aggregate absorption level in the economy (second row of Table A, left-
hand column).  
 
On the other hand, Ball (2002) points out that if the adverse exchange rate shock is from 
the financial side (for example, a sudden withdrawal of foreign investors from the country), 
an increase in the interest rate may be an appropriate response to stabilize both inflation 
and output (second row of Table A, right-hand column). While currency depreciation will 
increase external demand and prices, a higher interest rate will reduce domestic demand 
and stabilize inflation10. 
 
Nevertheless, in practice, many emerging market economies intervene to stabilize the 
exchange rate by changing interest rates, and the scale of such intervention also tends to be 
large. This raises the question of the factors that may account for this behavior. One 
reason, consistent with theory, is that major currency depreciations in emerging market 
economies have, in fact, been due to financial shocks, often resulting in high inflation. 
Second, exchange rate shocks tend to be large and persistent in emerging economies, 
which can create a dilemma for the central bank. If it chooses to absorb the exchange rate 
depreciation it might risk overshooting the inflation target and lose credibility. At the same 
time, defending the currency might require raising the interest rate to a very high level, 
which can cause large output losses.  
 
                                                
10 Ball (2002) argues that the most appropriate policy instrument in this case is a combination of the exchange rate and the 
interest rate (a monetary conditions index (MCI)) rather than the interest rate alone. Using the recent experience of Australia 
and New Zealand, he demonstrates that a response based on the MCI reduces output volatility compared to a response based on 
the interest rate when the source of the shock is a financial disturbance. Wollmershäuser (2003) reaches a similar conclusion by 
showing that central banks can reduce uncertainty about output and inflation by reacting to exchange rate shocks stemming 
from financial disturbances. A problem with this view, however, is that the MCI is not an instrument and that it is difficult to 
separate financial from real shocks. 
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In a recent study, Ho and McCauley (2003) show that emerging economies that miss their 
inflation targets are generally the ones experiencing sharp exchange rate volatility. This 
suggests that central banks may be ready to raise rates when faced with large currency 
depreciations. But they may, at the same time, prevent sharp contraction of the economy 
even at the cost of missing the inflation target. 
 
Central banks in emerging market economies may also assign a relatively higher weight to 
the exchange rate for reasons other than price stability - most importantly, maintaining 
financial stability. 
 
Calvo and Reinhart (2002) attribute such “fear of floating” behavior on the part of 
emerging economies to the high risk premium they have to pay because of their low 
institutional and policy credibility11. Such resistance to floating may be particularly high in 
countries with thin exchange markets, which are vulnerable to one-way expectations and 
herd behavior. A disorderly depreciation can encourage speculation through leads and lags 
in trade transactions and short-term capital flows, giving the exchange rate its own 
momentum.  
 
Many recent experiences of exchange market intervention go to support this concern. 
Partly because its exchange market is thin, India has tried to avoid excessive exchange rate 
volatility through foreign-exchange and interest rate interventions. When the Philippine 
peso came under strong depreciation pressure in the middle of 2001 and again in early 
2003, the central bank raised reserve requirements to limit currency speculation (Mohanty 
and Klau 2004). 
 
In some cases, financial imperfections such as a large amount of external debt or debt 
indexed to the exchange rate may have made the case for monetary policy intervention 
even stronger. Eichengreen (2002) and Goldstein and Turner (2004) have recently 
highlighted the adverse consequences of exchange rate depreciations in countries with a 
high degree of dollarization. Sharp currency depreciations in such circumstances, it is 
argued, can cause widespread bankruptcies and even change the sign of the exchange rate 
in the aggregate demand function from positive to negative.  
 
This rather unconventional contractionary impact of the exchange rate makes it necessary 
for the central bank to raise rates defensively against major exchange rate shocks12. 
                                                
11 In a recent paper, Alesina and Wagner (2003) argue that the “fear of floating” critically depends on the state of political 
institutions. Countries with poor political institutions end up with more volatile exchange rates than countries with sound 
political institutions. 
 
12 See also Kamin and Klau (1997) on the contractionary effects of the exchange rate on output. 
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III. The Taylor rule: A Literature Survey 
After exploring the foundation of the interest rate rules and its monetary policy 
implementation alternatives in the previous section, the paper focuses on the initial interest 
rate rule “Taylor (1993)” and its modifications ending with showing the augmented Taylor 
rule which is tailored for each individual country case. The paper, then, highlights how the 
interest rate rules can be used or abused while implementing monetary policy, from both 
descriptive and perspective points of view. In addition; it discusses both foundations of the 
theoretical and empirical choice of a benchmark rule  
 
Finally, after the previous theoretical base, the paper sheds light on how Taylor rule can be 
statically estimated and the best way to interpret and implement it. 
 
A- Taylor rule and its modifications 
Taylor Rule (1993) defined as; a simple rule works through an instrument13, which 
responds only to both inflation and output gap.  
 
Taylor (1993) suggested this rule as an explanation of the monetary policy setting for the 
early years of Alan Greenspan’s chairmanship of the Board of Governors of the U.S. 
Federal Reserve System, thereafter “the Fed” (1987–92). This rule became very popular, 
since it described a complicated process in very simple terms and fitted the data very well.  
 
Starting by a description for the original Taylor rule (1993) and present the modifications it 
has since undergone:  
 
- The Taylor rule (1993): 
……….. (5) 
 
where: it is the short-term nominal interest rate in period t; r* is the real interest rate; πt- π* is the 
“inflation gap” which represents the difference between the actual inflation πt and the inflation target π*; 
yt = log Yt – log Y*t is the output gap, where Yt is the real GDP and Y*t is the potential output14, and the 
coefficients Cπ and Cy are positive. 
 
In the original Taylor (1993) formulation, Cπ and Cy were both 0.5, the inflation and real 
interest rate targets were 2 percent each, and hence the constant C was equal to 1. 
 
                                                
13 The policy rate (the nominal short-term interest rate). 
14 Taylor (1993) identified potential output empirically with a linear trend, while other papers use quadratic, Hodrick-Prescott 
trends, or other more sophisticated techniques. 
tyttyttt yCCCyCCri +++=+−++= ππππ ππ )1()(
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This original Taylor rule has undergone various modifications as researchers have tried to 
make it either more realistic or appropriate. This part will discuss those modifications 
suited for rules not based on asset prices15, since these are the ones most commonly used.  
 
• One modification to the original rule has been to incorporate forward-looking behavior in 
order to counteract the seeming shortsightedness of policymakers, making the short-term 
interest rate a function of central bank expectations of output gap and inflation rather than 
their contemporaneous values16. 
 
• An alternative modification has been to introduce lags of inflation and output gap. It has 
been pointed out in the literature that because it is not possible to know the actual output 
gap and inflation at the time of setting the interest rate, using lags would make the timing 
more realistic (McCallum, 1999a)17. 
 
• Interest rate-smoothing behavior (including a lagged short-term interest rate among the 
fundamentals) is the single most popular modification of the Taylor rule. Clarida, Gali, and 
Gertler (1999) note that, although the necessity of including an interest rate smoothing 
term has not yet been proven theoretically, but it seems rather intuitive for several 
reasons18. 
 
• As simple as it is, the Taylor rule cannot possibly take into account all the factors 
affecting the economy. Policymakers are known to react not only to movements in the 
output gap and inflation, but also to movements in the exchange rate, stock market, and 
political developments, etc. The way to capture this issue would be to introduce a new 
variable, a so called policy shock variable, reflecting the judgmental element of the 
policymaking process. 
 
• Some authors suggest the use of unemployment gap as opposed to output gap, to improve 
the fit of the data, as suggested by Taylor (1999) and Orphanides and Williams (2003).  
 
• This modification reflects Okun's law (1962), which links the output gap and the 
unemployment gap. This type of rule tends to perform quite well in terms of stabilizing 
                                                
15 For estimations of monetary policy rules with asset prices and exchange rates in industrial countries, see Chadha, Sarno, and 
Valente (2004). 
16 The central bank expectations considered are either formed within a model, as in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), or actual 
estimates of the central bank in real time, as done by Orphanides (2001). Mehra (1999) has estimated short-term interest rate as 
a function of inflation expectations contained in bond rates. 
17 Lag-based rules are not necessarily backward-looking, since lags serve as indicators of future values (see Tchaidze, 2004). 
18 Reasons mentioned in the literature include model uncertainty, fear of disrupting capital markets, loss of credibility from a 
sudden large policy reversal, the need for consensus building for a policy change, and the exploitation by the central bank of the 
dependency of demand on expected future interest rates, signaling the central bank’s intentions toward the general public. 
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economic fluctuations, at least when natural rates of interest and unemployment are 
accurately measured19. 
 
• Finally, it has been suggested to use rates of growth of unemployment, or of the output 
gap, to account for measurement errors in the real-time estimates of the natural rate of 
unemployment and/or output (McCallum, 1999a, and Orphanides and Williams, 2003). 
 
So; many modifications have been made to the simple Taylor rule equation(5) (as 
Orphanides, 2001; etc.), to include more other variables as the exchange rate and the 
lagged nominal interest rate.  
 
These modifications were made according to each individual country case, using the 
variables which could affect the country’s monetary policy reaction function most as 
shown in the next equation:  
 …….. (6) 
 
where: it is the short-term nominal interest rate in period t; r* is the real interest rate; πt- π* is the “inflation 
gap” which represents the difference between the actual inflation πt and the inflation target π*; yt is the 
actual output and y*t is the potential output, xr is the log level of the real effective exchange rate, and ∆ is 
the first difference operator. γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4, γ5 are the policy parameters, and εt is the stochastic innovation. 
 
Equation (6) usually referred to as the Augmented Taylor Rule; where it is tailored for each 
individual country case. 
                                                
19 The rules with the unemployment gap appear more attractive as the natural rate of unemployment seemed easier to measure. 
During the mid–1990s, it was a common belief that NAIRU was 6 percent flat. The productivity growth of the late 1990s and 
arrival of the so-called New Economy have begun, only with a substantial delay, to challenge this belief (see Ball and Tchaidze, 
2002). 
ttttttttt ixrxryyri εγγγγππγπ ++∆+∆+−+−++= −− 15143*2*1 )()(*
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B- Uses and Abuses of the Taylor rule 
Taylor rules have been widely used in theoretical and empirical papers, with the latter 
examining the rules both from descriptive and prescriptive points of view. 
 
The focus of research in theoretical papers has been on: whether simple rules solve the 
time inconsistency bias (McCallum, 1999a); or they are optimal (McCallum, 1999a; 
Svensson, 2003; Woodford, 2001; etc.)20; and on how they perform in different 
macroeconomic models (Taylor, 1999; Isard, Laxton and Eliasson, 1999)21. 
 
As for the empirical papers, those with a descriptive point of view include analysis of 
various specifications and estimations of the Taylor rule (Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1998; 
Kozicki, 1999; Judd and Rudebusch 1998; etc.).  These studies examine particular 
historical episodes and address two questions: to what extent are simple instrument rules 
good empirical descriptions of central bank behavior; and what is the average response of 
the policy instrument to movements in various fundamentals?22 
 
Empirical papers with a prescriptive point of view suggest what the interest rate should be 
(McCallum, 1999a and 1999b; Bryant, Hooper, and Mann, 1993; Taylor, 1999), or how it 
should be set. Commonly, these suggestions are based on rules that are either the outcome 
of theoretical papers or the result of estimating “good/successful” periods of monetary 
policy. 
 
The potential abuses in prescriptive papers are mainly related to the choice of the 
benchmark rules, whether based on theory or empirical evidence. The following part 
provides a brief description of the problems that might arise when choosing such rules. 
 
                                                
20 One could derive versions of the Taylor rule as a solution to an optimization problem, where policymakers are minimizing a 
loss function expressed in terms of the weighted average of inflation and output gap variances (see for example, Woodford, 
2001). 
21 In terms of stabilizing inflation around an inflation target, without causing unnecessary output gap variability. 
22 The two questions commonly get mixed, though they are somewhat independent from each other. Properly formulated, the 
second question would sound as follows: given the way the monetary authorities are operating, what is the consequential 
response of the interest rate to movements in inflation and the output gap? 
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Theoretical Choice of a Benchmark Rule Policy: advice based on rules from theoretical 
models comes from rules simulated or derived in a model or class of models considered 
representative of the economy. There are potential problems with this approach as 
documented in the literature and surveyed below: 
 
• Svensson (2003) and Woodford (2001) warn that commitment to simple rules may not 
always be optimal, as a simple policy rule may be a solution too simple for a task as 
complex as that of a central bank23. 
 
• Simple policy rules may not be robust across different models. Due to uncertainty about 
the true model of the economy and/or potential output levels, the most recent theoretical 
efforts have concentrated on suggesting a set of robust simple rules that could be used as a 
basis for policy advice, as in Giannoni and Woodford (2003a and 2003b), Svensson and 
Woodford (2004), Walsh (2004), etc. Isard, Laxton and Eliasson (1999) show that several 
classes of Taylor type rules perform very poorly in moderately nonlinear models. 
 
• Several recent papers show that, when the central bank follows Taylor type rules in sticky 
price models of the type that fit the U.S. data well, the price level may not be determined, 
and there could be several paths for the instrument and multiple equilibria, all coming from 
the same model with the same rule (Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe, 2001; Carlstrom 
and Fuerst, 2001; etc.). 
 
• How policymakers should respond to the presence of measurement errors is a question 
with no firm answer yet. While some researchers advocate a more cautious approach, with 
smaller response coefficients (Orphanides, 2001), others advocate a more aggressive 
approach (i.e., with larger coefficients) to policymaking (Onatski and Stock, 2002). 
Finally, some studies have argued in favor of “certainty equivalence,” which implies no 
changes in policymakers’ behavior and response coefficients (Swanson, 2004). 
 
• Most theoretical papers talk about inflation in rather generic terms. Thus, when it comes 
to policy prescriptions, it is not clear what particular measure should be used − Consumer 
Price Index (CPI), core CPI, CPI less food and energy (most volatile items), GDP deflator, 
etc. 
 
• Even after a particular index is chosen, there are more choices to make: annual or 
quarterly; if annual, is it the average of quarterly numbers or a growth rate over the four 
quarters? Is the growth in CPI calculated as a log difference or a ratio? Even though the 
                                                
23 Svensson (2003, p. 429): “Monetary policy by the world’s more advanced central banks these days is at least as optimizing 
and forward-looking as the behavior of the most rational private agents. I find it strange that a large part of the literature on 
monetary policy still prefers to represent central bank behavior with the help of mechanical instrument rules.” 
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differences between these various calculations could be minimal in a case of low and stable 
inflation, one should be aware of these caveats. Similar issues arise when it comes to 
measuring the output gap. 
 
• Any formula-based recommendation is bound to ignore the judgmental element, which 
reflects policymakers’ account of other developments not reflected in the output gap or 
inflation behavior. 
 
Empirical Choice of a Benchmark Rule: Policy advice based on rules from empirical 
papers comes, usually, from estimating a period that is considered “good” or “successful” 
in combating inflation, promoting output growth, or both. Like the theoretical approach 
this empirical approach brings with it several problems: 
 
• Rogoff (2003) notes that, it is not clear how much credit policymakers deserve for the 
exceptionally good performance of many economies in the last 15 years or so. He notes 
that the achievement of price stability globally may be due not only to good policymaking 
but also to the favorable macroeconomic environment. The main cause that he identifies is 
globalization, which through increased competition, has put a downward pressure on 
prices. 
 
• Stock and Watson (2003) also argue that improvements in the conduct of monetary policy 
after 1979 are only partially responsible for reducing the variance of output during business 
cycle fluctuations. This could have been caused by “improved ability of individuals and 
firms to smooth shocks because of innovation and deregulation in financial markets” 
(Stock and Watson, 2003, p. 46). They also note that during this period, macroeconomic 
shocks were “unusually quiescent”. 
 
• Even if one finds empirically a Taylor rule, it does not imply that it is the basis of the 
monetary policy decision making. The empirical relationship found may be a reflection of 
something else – a long-term relationship among the nominal interest rate, inflation, and 
the output gap24, or a reflection of a completely different kind of monetary policy25. 
 
• Also as Svensson and Woodford (2004, p. 24) note, “Any policy rule implies a ‘reaction 
function,’ that specifies the central bank’s instrument as a function of predetermined 
endogenous or exogenous variables observable to the central bank at the time that it sets 
                                                
24 As the definition of the rule (see equation (5)) shows, one may view the Taylor rule as a more sophisticated version of an 
equilibrium relationship among the three variables (also known as a Fisher equation, i = r + π). 
25 Minford, Perugini and Srinivasan (2002) and Auray and Feve (2003 and 2004) demonstrate that money supply rules may be 
observationally equivalent to Taylor rules. 
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the instrument.” They warn that this “implied reaction function” should not, in general, be 
confused with the policy rule itself. 
 
• When making policy prescriptions, can one really impose the implied response 
coefficients and targets of one economic or policy regime on another, without accounting 
for changes in the structure of the economy? Greenspan particularly has warned about this 
abuse on several occasions, including in January 2004 in his speech to the American 
Economic Association (AEA) meetings: “Such rules suffer from much of the same fixed-
coefficient difficulties we have with our large-scale models.” 
 
• Even though there may be no changes in the economy, there may be changes in the 
attitude of policymakers. Such changes could be reflected in a shifting of targets for real 
interest rate or inflation (which, in terms of Taylor rules, translate into a different constant), 
or there may be changes in the weights that policymakers assign to inflation variance and 
output gap variance (which, in terms of Taylor rules, translates into different inflation and 
output gap response coefficients). 
 
• Coefficients might not be estimated with a very high degree of precision, and standard 
errors could be quite large. Once the size of the confidence intervals is taken into account, 
the policy recommendations on how the instrument should be set could become blurred. 
 
• While coefficients may be estimated for very particular measures of inflation and/or the 
output gap (for example, CPI less food and energy and Hodrick-Prescott (HP) detrended 
log output), it is the values only that get “remembered”, when policy recommendations are 
made. These coefficients may be coupled with different measures (for example, GDP 
deflator and linearly detrended log output, which in general results in larger values for the 
output gap than the HP detrending), without taking into account that the coefficients would 
have been different, in the sense that, these alternative measures been used for the 
estimation. 
 
• As mentioned above, any formula-based recommendation is bound to ignore the 
judgmental element, which is an important factor behind policy decisions. So; using Taylor 
rule as a mix of rule-based and discretionary monetary policy implementation regime 
represents the best choice in many economists` point of view (Feldstein 1999). 
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C- Estimating Taylor Rules 
The rules are usually estimated using either ordinary least squares (OLS), if they are 
backward looking (see, for example, Orphanides, 2001), or instrumental variables and 
generalized method of moments (GMM) if they are forward looking (see, for example, 
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler, 2000), and it is not obvious that the following econometric 
problems are addressed properly, or always taken into consideration: 
 
• The most obvious econometric question is how to deal with high serial correlation of the 
variables. The common recipe is to use Newey-West standard errors and serial correlation 
robust estimators in order to account for heteroschedasticity, and instrumental variables to 
account for the forward-looking rules. What is worth noting, however, is that while papers 
estimating Taylor rules commonly treat interest rates as stationary series, most term 
structure and money demand papers treat interest rates of various maturity as I(1) series26, 
which would call for different econometric techniques. 
 
• The estimates are not very robust to differences in assumptions or estimation techniques. 
Jondeau, Le Bihan, and Galles (2004) show that, over the baseline period 1979–2000, 
alternative estimates of the Fed’s reaction function using several GMM estimators27 and a 
maximum likelihood estimator yield substantially different parameter estimates. Estimation 
results may also not be robust with respect to sample periods, to different sets of 
instrumental variables, or to the order of lags (when lags of variables are used as 
instruments). 
 
• In addition, estimation of the Taylor rules very often requires inputs from separate 
estimation exercises, such as an evaluation of the output gap. These procedures are subject 
to the same kinds of problems, and, hence, the level of uncertainty around coefficients 
doubles. 
 
• As in other empirical papers, making policy recommendations based on rules estimated 
from a short sample is not advised. This caveat applies especially to countries that have 
short periods of stable data. 
 
• The alternative use of long samples often ignores the possibility of changes in the 
parameters of the rule—response coefficients or real interest rate or inflation targets. For 
                                                
26 King and Kurmann (2002) analyze the term structure of the U.S. interest rates, and Baba, Hendry, and Starr (1992) analyze 
the U.S. money demand. Both papers find that U.S. interest rates are stationary in first differences, and therefore non-stationary 
in levels, I(1) series. However, Mehra (1993) finds in money demand studies that U.S. interest rates are stationary series, and 
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000, p. 154) note that they treat interest rates as stationary series, “an assumption that we view as 
reasonable for the postwar U.S., even though the null of a unit root in either variables is often hard to reject.” 
 
27 For example: two-step, iterative, and continuously updating. 
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example, one should make a distinction between the monetary regime of the Fed during 
Paul Volcker’s chairmanship and that during Greenspan’s chairmanship. While, in both 
periods, the Fed was committed to price stability, it is doubtful that inflation targets were 
the same28. A former Fed Governor, Janet Yellen (Federal Reserve Board, 1995, pp. 43–4), 
confirms this implicitly when she says that the Taylor rule seems to be a good description 
of the Fed’s behavior since 1986, but not of its behavior from 1979 when Volcker was 
appointed chairman, to 198629. 
 
• A rather important but still commonly overlooked caveat has been given by 
Orphanides (2001, p. 964). He finds that real-time policy recommendations differ 
considerably from those obtained with ex-post revised data, and that estimated policy 
reaction functions based on such data provide misleading descriptions of historical policy 
and obscure the behavior suggested by information available to the Fed in real time30. 
 
• The illusionary effects of a stronger or weaker response to movements in certain 
fundamentals that arise due to their horizon misspecification are documented by 
Orphanides (2001). It showed that the policy reaction function, which has forward-looking 
behavior but includes forecasts of less than four quarters ahead, has higher estimates for 
the lag of the federal funds rate and for the output gap, but lower estimate for inflation, 
compared with the specification with forecasts of four quarters ahead. 
 
• Another illusionary effect, which is caused by monetary policy inertia, is documented by 
Rudebusch (2002). He argues that a policy rule with interest rate smoothing is difficult to 
distinguish from a rule with serially correlated policy shocks31. While in the former 
persistent deviations from the output gap and inflation response occur because 
policymakers are deliberately slow to react, in the latter these deviations reflect 
policymakers’ response to other persistent influences. Rudebusch proposes to distinguish 
between the two by analyzing the interest rate term structure. 
 
Finally; economists should carefully estimate Taylor rules in practice, taking into 
consideration the above issues, otherwise they will end up with misleading results.  
 
                                                
28 In fact, one may wonder whether the Fed had a constant inflation target during Volcker’s chairmanship (see Tchaidze, 2004). 
29 “It seems to me that a reaction function in which the real funds rate changes by roughly equal amounts in response to 
deviations of inflation from a target of 2 percent and to deviations of actual from potential output describes tolerably well what 
this Committee has done since 1986.’’(Federal Reserve Board, 1995 p. 43--4). 
30 Orphanides (2003a) shows, contrary to other researchers who claim that U.S. monetary policy in the 1970s was "bad," 
leading to high inflation, that policy was "good" but based on "bad," misleading data. 
31 Such a phenomenon has been documented in the literature before. See Grilliches (1967) and Blinder (1986). 
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IV. Taylor Rule Applications: The Case of Egypt 
In this section; the entire theoretical basis previously discussed are considered while 
estimating the Taylor Rule in case of Egypt.  
 
During the study period, Egypt switched between different regimes while implementing 
both monetary and the exchange rate policies, so the starting point will be reviewing 
Egypt’s monetary policy historical background. This guides the paper through both 
building up and interpreting the model.   
 
The paper, then, estimates both the central bank reaction function and the augmented 
Taylor rule models using the E-views econometric package, and interprets the output. 
 
Thus, this section will be presented as follows: 
A- Monetary policy in Egypt: An overview during 1990 to 2007 
B- Constructing the model 
1- The data 
2- Methodology: the models 
i- The first model: The central banks` reaction function 
ii- The second model: The Augmented Taylor rule 
  
A- Monetary policy in Egypt: an overview during 1990 to 2007 
This section presents a brief historical review for the main components of the Central Bank 
of Egypt’s monetary policy framework. The review considers the recent developments in 
the ultimate objective of the CBE monetary policy, the intermediate and operational targets 
that were selected to achieve that objective and the monetary instruments adopted to affect 
those targets. In addition, the paper reviews the exchange rate developments. In this 
context, we divide Egypt’s` monetary policy framework into three components: 
 
• First: the ultimate (principle) target of the monetary policy 
During 1990 through 2003, with the exception of 1996/1997, the CBE has continually 
focused on achieving two main objectives, namely, price stability and exchange rate 
stability. The monetary policy, however, exhibited overt inconsistencies, particularly 
during 1992/1993-1996/1997. In 1992/1993, besides price and exchange rate stability, the 
CBE planned to achieve ostensibly conflicting objectives; while the CBE aimed at 
controlling the monetary expansion through implying a contractionary policy, it also called 
for a cut of the interest rate on the Egyptian pound to encourage investment and promote 
economic growth thereby implying an expansionary stance (CBE 1992/1993).  
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At the second stage of the economic reform program 1993/1994, the thrust of the monetary 
policy shifted to the promotion of growth in the productive sectors as a means of 
stimulating aggregate productivity (CBE 1993/1994). The CBE primary objective shifted 
back to the expansionary monetary control and output growth recipe during the 2-year 
period 1994/1995 to 1995/1996. In 1996/1997, the CBE reverted once more to the 
objective of economic growth via monetary stabilization. 
 
In 2003 and going forward ,the CBE announced it ultimate target to be price stability, 
stated by the Law 88 for year 2003 regarding the central bank, the banking sector and 
foreign exchange. 
 
• Second: CBE intermediate and operational targets 
Alternatively, throughout the period 1990/1991 until 2004/2007, the different proximate 
targets of monetary policy seemed fairly consistent. The CBE intermediate target entailed 
the control of the annual growth rate of domestic liquidity measured in terms of the broad 
money supply, M2. Similarly, during the entire period under consideration, save 
2004/2005, the two operational target components, management of nominal interest rates 
and the control of banks' excess reserves in domestic currency at the CBE, remained 
unchanged. Starting from June 2005; the overnight interest rate on interbank transactions 
was designated as the operational target. 
 
• Third: CBE monetary policy instruments 
To achieve its targets, the CBE depended mostly on a number of indirect, market-based 
instruments such as the required reserve ratio, reserve money and open market operations 
along with a host of interest rates including the discount rate, Treasury-bill rate, and loan 
and deposit interest rates. The choice of indirect instead of direct instruments was 
motivated by the initiation of the monetary policy reform act as part of the country's overall 
economic reform program signed with the IMF.  
 
* Direct instruments: (e.g., quantitative and administrative determination of interest rates 
using credit and interest rate ceilings) were abolished for the private and the public sectors 
starting 1992 and 1993, respectively. Consequently, public enterprises were allowed to 
deal with all banks without prior permission from a lending public bank (Hussein and 
Noshy 2000).  
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 * Indirect instruments (where the CBE started to exercise since 1991 with the advice of 
the IMF, under the structural reform program): 
 
- The discount rate: the CBE use the discount rate as a monetary policy instrument during 
1990 to 2007. During that period, the discount rate was lowered gradually from 19.8 
percent in 1992 to approximately 9 percent by the beginning of 2006 and continue to hold 
tell the end of 2007, with the hope of promoting investment32. 
 
To reduce the rigidity in the discount rate, the CBE linked it to the interest rate on Treasury 
Bills. This resulted in a steady decline in the interest rate on Treasury Bills, which 
decreased starting 1992 through 1998 (See Figure 1). The interest rate on Treasury Bills 
began to recover once again in 2002 only to attain a maximum in the following year. 
Source: CBE data. 
                                                
32 The discount rate is typically considered a poor operational monetary policy instrument because it is usually subjected to 
strong administrative control. Thus, shocks in the discount rate do not always account for variation in the monetary stance 
(Bernanke and Mihov 1998). In Egypt; the discount rate characterized with rigidity, where it used to held unchanged for long 
periods. Rageh (2005) 
Figure 1: Discount Rate And 3-M T-bills Rate 
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- The interest rates on loans and on deposits: by January 1991; the CBE had liberalized 
the interest rates on loans and on deposits. Banks were given the freedom to set their loan 
and deposit interest rates subject to the restriction that the 3-month interest rate on deposits 
should not fall below 12 percent per annum. This restriction was cancelled thereafter in 
1993/1994 (See figure 2).  
Source: CBE data. 
 
- Due to the continuous decrease in the discount rate, interest rates on loans (one year or 
less) also fell during the period 1995-1999 before they started to rise slightly again in 2000. 
The decline in the interest rate on loans led to a reduction in the returns on deposits held in 
domestic currency. The domestic currency deposits, however, were not significantly 
affected by the fall in the interest rate since the interest rate on the Egyptian pound deposits 
remained relatively higher than the equivalent rates paid on foreign currencies33 (See figure 
3) (El-Asrag 2003). 
                                                
33 Showing a 5 percent average spread on the 3-month EGP-USD deposit rates during the period 1995-99, derived from CBE 
data. 
Figure 2: Domestic Interest Rates
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Source: CBE data. 
 
- Open market operations are the most important instrument that affects the short run 
nominal interest rate through their capacity to absorb and manage excess liquidity in the 
economy and to sterilize the effect of increases in international reserves. Open market 
operations in Egypt are working through a number of tools including REPOs, reverse 
REPOs, and final purchase of Treasury Bills and government bonds, foreign exchange 
swaps and debt certificates (Abu El Eyoun 2003).  
 
In 1997/1998, the CBE increased its dependence on an alternative instrument, the 
repurchasing operations of Treasury Bills (repos), to provide liquidity and to stimulate 
economic growth. The volume of these operations increased, reaching LE 209 billion in 
1999/2000. The reliance on repos, however, started to decrease in 2000/2001 reaching a 
minimum in 2002/2003.  
 
In 2003/2004, the CBE introduced the reverse repos of Treasury Bills and permitted 
outright sales of Treasury Bills between the CBE and banks through the market 
mechanism. In August 2005, the CBE notes were introduced instead of the Treasury Bills 
reverse repos as an instrument for the management of the monetary policy. 
 
The use of open market operations became consistent with the liberalization of the interest 
rates once the CBE resorted to the market as a means of financing government debt. The 
primary dealers system, which became effective in July 2004, increased the importance of 
the open market operations as an instrument of monetary policy. 
 
Figure 3: 3M Deposits Rate 
(In percent)
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- The domestic and foreign currency required reserve ratios represented another key 
instrument of monetary policy. During the period 1990-2007, the domestic and foreign 
required reserve ratios ranged between approximately 14-15 percent and 10-15 percent, 
respectively (CBE data). The domestic required reserve ratio alone has not been significant 
instrument, as the Egyptian economy usually showed an excess liquidity climate.  
 
• Exchange rate developments 
Apart from the modifications in the structure of the indirect monetary policy instruments, 
the CBE undertook a number of notable reforms in the exchange rate system. At the 
beginning of the 1990s, Egypt officially implemented a managed float regime, with the 
exchange rate acting as a nominal anchor for monetary policy. Yet, in reality, the country 
had adopted a fixed exchange rate regime with the authorities setting the official exchange 
rate without regard for market forces. This resulted in a highly stable exchange rate for the 
Egyptian pound against the US dollar and a black market for foreign exchange (El-Asrag 
2003). In February 1991, a dual exchange rate regime, which included a primary restricted 
market and a secondary free market, was introduced to raise foreign competitiveness and to 
simplify the exchange rate system. The two markets were unified in October 1991. From 
then and up until 1998, the Egyptian pound was freely traded in a single exchange market 
with limited intervention by the authorities to keep the exchange rate against the US dollar 
within the boundaries of an implicit band (ERF and IM 2004). 
 
The appreciation of the real exchange rate during the 1990s was probably the key factor 
behind the liquidity shortage. Following the liberalization and unification of the foreign 
exchange rate in 1991, the nominal exchange rate remained within excessively tight 
bounds (between LE 3.2-3.4 per dollar).  
 
The second half of the 1990s was characterized by a tight monetary stance. El-Refaay 
(2000) detects that tightness based on the observed slowdown in the growth rate of M2 and 
of reserve money.  
 
By 1997, the Egyptian economy had started to feel the crunch of a liquidity crisis owing to 
internal and external shocks that led to a shortage in both domestic and foreign (i.e. US 
dollar) currencies. The internal shocks were prompted by a large increase in bank lending, 
particularly to the private sector. A significant part of the bank credit extended to the 
private sector in the 1990s was directed to real estate investments. In the absence of 
matching demand, the relative increase in the supply of housing units made it difficult for 
the real estate investors to repay their bank loans. The supply-demand mismatch raised the 
rates of loan default and instigated a liquidity shortage in the banking system. The liquidity 
crisis was intensified by the large fiscal debt, which was sparked by the government's 
initiation of several huge projects at the same time including Toshka Project, Al-Salam 
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Canal, North West Gulf of Suez Development Project and East of Port Said Project 
(Hussein and Noshy 2000). 
 
The financing of these projects greatly depended on bank deposits. The strain on bank 
deposits increased with the accumulation of a large government debt to public and private 
construction firms. Moreover, external shocks, including the fall in oil, tourism and Suez 
Canal revenues and the decrease of workers' remittances from abroad by the end of the 
1990s exacerbated the liquidity problem. 
 
The nominal exchange rate rigidity in conjunction with high real interest rates caused a real 
appreciation in the value of the Egyptian pound that not only depleted the economy's 
foreign competitiveness but also triggered significant market speculation. The foreign 
exchange market instability and the increase in the importation bill— financed through 
bank loans—created a shortage of US dollars in the economy (Hussein and Noshy 2000). 
 
The move to an exchange rate peg during the 1990s was accompanied by accommodating 
changes in the monetary policy. However; it was impossible to pursue an active monetary 
policy with a fixed exchange rate regime. 
 
In January 2001; Egypt replaced the de facto Egyptian pound to US dollar peg with an 
adjustable currency band, where the Egyptian pound gradually lost about 48 percent of its 
value against the US dollar over the period 2001-2003. (ERF and IM 2004)  
 
On January 29, 2003, the adjustable peg was swapped with a floating exchange rate regime 
(See figure 4). Under the free float, banks were permitted to determine the buy and sell 
prices of exchange rates. The CBE was barred from intervention in setting the foreign 
exchange rate, except to correct for major imbalances and sharp swings (El-Asrag 2003).  
 
The move from the managed float system to a flexible exchange rate regime denotes a 
transformation from an implicit policy rule to a non-committal absence of a monetary 
policy rule (Bartley 2001 and Mundell 2000). Accordingly, the liberalization of the pound 
marks the demise of an implicit dual-component monetary rule system with intricate price 
stability and exchange rate stability rules. 
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Source: CBE data. 
 
Despite the liberalization of the pound in 2003, the CBE has continued to maintain 
exchange rate stability as one of its key objectives during the following years, 2004 till 
2007. Suspecting that further going; the CBE might still choose to keep a tight grip on the 
foreign exchange market.  
 
In theory, efficient monetary policymaking, however, tolerates intervention in the foreign 
exchange market only by means of policy measures. So far, the CBE has a good record on 
that account. For instance, the fears of dollarization that followed the liberalization of the 
pound, prompted the CBE to tighten monetary policy through an increase in the rate of 
interest (CBE 2004/2005). 
 
Starting from 2006 and going forward; the main objective of the CBE has been to keep 
inflation low and stable. That objective was cast within the context of a general program to 
move eventually toward anchoring monetary policy by inflation-targeting once the 
fundamental machinery needed for its implementation is installed (CBE 2005).  
 
Meanwhile, in the transition period, the CBE intends to meet its inflation stabilization 
objective through the management of the short-term interest rates and the control of other 
factors that affect the inflation rate including shocks to credit and to money supply (CBE 
2005).  
Figure 4: Nominal Exchange Rate 
(EGP per USD )
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In view of the recent changes in policymaking initiated by the CBE, we anticipate that the 
upcoming period shall witness important actions to conduct monetary policy on objective 
and methodical bases.  
 
Believing that good measurement of monetary policy and of the stance within the last 15 
years or so should provide a suitable inferential point of departure en route toward the 
support of those actions. 
 
Précising; the above narrative establishes the importance of price stability as the principle 
objective of the CBE, showing that since the beginning of the 1990s till 2005; the reserves 
have played a key role as monetary instrument under the control of the CBE for achieving 
that objective. While, starting from 2005 and going forward (the launching of the corridor 
system); the short-run interest rates became the operational target of the CBE, consistently 
with the preparation for adapting the inflation targeting regime. 
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B- Constructing the model 
1- The data 
• The output gap: for the actual output; the industrial production (from the CAPMAS) is 
used (on a quarterly basis34) as a proxy for the actual GDP, as it represents the largest 
compound of the GDP (around 18 percent during 2007)35. For the potential output, we 
applied the HP filter technique to derive the potential output from the selected actual 
output series36. 
 
• The central bank policy rate (nominal interest rate): From the mid-1980s to 2007, the 
CBE used different rates of interest as policy instruments. For example; the discount 
rate, the 3-month deposit rate, the Treasury Bills rate and the interbank overnight rate. 
To maintain a sufficient number of degrees of freedom, it would not be practically 
feasible to take account of all these interest rates concurrently in a VAR model. We 
picked the 3-month deposit rate (from the Central Bank of Egypt) to represent the 
interest rate component of the CBE operating procedure37. 
 
• The inflation rate: we selected the year-on-year monthly inflation rate based on the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) (from the CAPMAS), rather than any other inflation index 
as the Whole Price Index (WPI) for two reasons. First: most of the related studies use 
the CPI while estimating the interest rate rule. Second: the CAPMAS stopped the WPI 
series in November 2007; on the other hand, it started to issue a new series regarding 
the Producer Price Index (PPI) instead. 
 
•  The long-run equilibrium real interest rate: this constant value is calculated as 
follows: first: derived the long-run path of the 3-month domestic deposit rate using the 
HP filter technique, second: we calculated the simple average of the derived long-run 
path to get the natural rate of return. 
 
• The exchange rate: for this variable, we followed the other related studies to use the 
real effective exchange rate (REER) of the Egyptian pound38 (an increase means an 
appreciation), while estimating the interest rate rule in Egypt. 
                                                
34 The quarterly series is converted to a monthly one using the E-views frequency conversion technique (Quadratic-match 
average). 
35 Source: Central Bank of Egypt web-site 
36 Although the limitation of the HP filter technique, regarding the constant parameter (λ) which controls the smoothness of the 
trend component (λ = 14400 for monthly data), but it gave better results than other techniques as Nadaraya-Watson detrending 
technique. 
37 It represents the most consistent series, while the Treasury Bills and the interbank overnight rate policy instruments were 
introduced in different periods; the selected time horizon for analyzing the movement in those instruments differs accordingly. 
38 Source: A study preformed by the Monetary Policy Unit stuff under the supervision of Mr. Ahmed Noshy (Assistance Sub-
governor of research and development section, Central Bank of Egypt). 
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Table 1 in appendix A, show the data spread sheet. Also, Figures 1 to 3 in the mean 
appendix, represent the movements in both CPI inflation rate and 3-month deposits rate, 
industrial production and its potential detrended series, and nominal exchange rate and 
REER, respectively. 
Table 2: Data description 
Variable Description 
I 3-month Deposit rate (%) 
CPI Consumer Price Index Inflation rate (y-on-y) (%) 
IP Industrial Production (in million EGP) 
YPOTEN Potential Industrial Production (Output) using hp-trending 
LREER Log Real Effective Exchange rate using CPI (%) 
DV_REER Dummy Variable (DV_REER= 1 starting from 2003:01, and zero otherwise) 
YGAP The output gap ( IP – YPOTEN ) 
 
2- Methodology: the models 
i- The first model: The central banks` reaction function 
 
In this context, we estimated the central bank reaction function in the case of both closed 
and open economy, using the vector autoregression (VAR) technique to show the short-
run relation between the variables. This relation can be shown by the impulse response 
function derived from the VAR, to exam the effect of the inflation, output gap and the 
exchange rate shocks on the interest rate. In addition, the variance decomposition is 
derived to show how much variation in the nominal interest rate as a monetary policy 
instrument is attributed to the different shocks. 
 
Equations (1)-(4) illustrated in part three and the relevant parametric restrictions were 
employed to estimate the parameters of an un-structural VAR for each of both closed and 
open economy models described above in part three. The VAR estimates are obtained 
using monthly data for Egypt during the period 1997-2007. 
 
The paper follows the academic literature that has tried to identify monetary policy 
shocks. Thus, in common with previous research, the paper use variables those are in 
levels.39 
 
                                                
39 For more details see Christiano et al. (1998), Favero (2001) and Leeper et al. (1996) for reviews of the literature. 
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The central banks` reaction functions in a closed economy 
Table 2 in appendix C; reports the un-structural VAR parameter estimates and their 
standard errors obtained from the closed economy model. The un-structural VAR 
specification was fit with 8 lags in levels of the 3-month deposits rate, CPI and the output 
gap40. 
 
The closed economy VAR Model representation: 
================================================ 
I = C(1,1)*I(-1) + C(1,2)*I(-2) + C(1,3)*I(-3) + C(1,4)*I(-4) + C(1,5)*I(-5) + C(1,6)*I(-6) + C(1,7)*I(-
7) + C(1,8)*I(-8) + C(1,9)*CPI(-1) + C(1,10)*CPI(-2) + C(1,11)*CPI(-3) + C(1,12)*CPI(-4) + 
C(1,13)*CPI(-5) + C(1,14)*CPI(-6) + C(1,15)*CPI(-7) + C(1,16)*CPI(-8) + C(1,17)*YGAP(-1) + 
C(1,18)*YGAP(-2) + C(1,19)*YGAP(-3) + C(1,20)*YGAP(-4) + C(1,21)*YGAP(-5) + 
C(1,22)*YGAP(-6) + C(1,23)*YGAP(-7) + C(1,24)*YGAP(-8) + C(1,25) 
 
CPI = C(2,1)*I(-1) + C(2,2)*I(-2) + C(2,3)*I(-3) + C(2,4)*I(-4) + C(2,5)*I(-5) + C(2,6)*I(-6) + 
C(2,7)*I(-7) + C(2,8)*I(-8) + C(2,9)*CPI(-1) + C(2,10)*CPI(-2) + C(2,11)*CPI(-3) + C(2,12)*CPI(-4) 
+ C(2,13)*CPI(-5) + C(2,14)*CPI(-6) + C(2,15)*CPI(-7) + C(2,16)*CPI(-8) + C(2,17)*YGAP(-1) + 
C(2,18)*YGAP(-2) + C(2,19)*YGAP(-3) + C(2,20)*YGAP(-4) + C(2,21)*YGAP(-5) + 
C(2,22)*YGAP(-6) + C(2,23)*YGAP(-7) + C(2,24)*YGAP(-8) + C(2,25) 
 
YGAP = C(3,1)*I(-1) + C(3,2)*I(-2) + C(3,3)*I(-3) + C(3,4)*I(-4) + C(3,5)*I(-5) + C(3,6)*I(-6) + 
C(3,7)*I(-7) + C(3,8)*I(-8) + C(3,9)*CPI(-1) + C(3,10)*CPI(-2) + C(3,11)*CPI(-3) + C(3,12)*CPI(-4) 
+ C(3,13)*CPI(-5) + C(3,14)*CPI(-6) + C(3,15)*CPI(-7) + C(3,16)*CPI(-8) + C(3,17)*YGAP(-1) + 
C(3,18)*YGAP(-2) + C(3,19)*YGAP(-3) + C(3,20)*YGAP(-4) + C(3,21)*YGAP(-5) + 
C(3,22)*YGAP(-6) + C(3,23)*YGAP(-7) + C(3,24)*YGAP(-8) + C(3,25) 
                                                
40 The Hannan-Quinn (HQ) information criterion was used to choose the VAR lag length for both the closed and open economy 
models. 
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Figure 5: Impulse response functions 
 
Figure 5 above, shows the impulse response functions of the 3-month deposits rate, CPI 
inflation rate, and output gap. Compromises two important findings: 
1- The response of CPI to both the interest rate and output gap shocks will have a 
continuous negative impact. Alternatively, a weak41 positive continuous impact of 
interest rate to a CPI shock is determined. 
2- No long-run impact of interest rate on the output gap, as the model implies very weak 
effects for the interest rate shock on output gap during the sample period, which will 
die after six months.  
On the other hand, the model shows a significant response of the output-gap to a price 
shock, which will also; vanish after six periods (no long-run impact). 
 
                                                
41 Doesn’t exceed 5 percent. 
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Figure 6: Variance decomposition 
 
In addition, figure 6; regarding the variance decomposition shows that: about 15, 30 
percent of the variation in CPI is attributed to the nominal interest rate and output gap 
respectively. On the other hand; only 10 percent of the variation in the output gap is due 
to CPI, and otherwise is negligible variation. 
 
So; the derived closed economy un-structured VAR model, is not capable of emulating 
the anticipated theoretical responses of other significant variables, particularly output 
gap, to policy innovations. We found that the impact of monetary policy shocks on the 
size and on the direction of change in output gap and in prices was either negligible or 
insignificant. This may be attributed to neglecting other significant variables as the 
exchange rate effect, as Egypt represents an open economy. 
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The central banks` reaction functions in an open economy 
Table 4 in appendix A; reports the un-structural VAR parameter estimates and their 
standard errors obtained from the open economy model. The un-structural VAR 
specification was fit with 2 lags in levels of the 3-month deposits rate, CPI, the output 
gap, and log level of the real effective exchange rate (REER). We introduced a dummy 
variable42 as an exogenous variable to offset the impact of the structural change which 
took place in January 2003 in the Egyptian exchange rate policy43. 
 
The open economy VAR Model representation: 
=============================================== 
I = C(1,1)*I(-1) + C(1,2)*I(-2) + C(1,3)*CPI(-1) + C(1,4)*CPI(-2) + C(1,5)*YGAP(-1) + 
C(1,6)*YGAP(-2) + C(1,7)*LREER(-1) + C(1,8)*LREER(-2) + C(1,9) + C(1,10)*DV_REER 
 
CPI = C(2,1)*I(-1) + C(2,2)*I(-2) + C(2,3)*CPI(-1) + C(2,4)*CPI(-2) + C(2,5)*YGAP(-1) + 
C(2,6)*YGAP(-2) + C(2,7)*LREER(-1) + C(2,8)*LREER(-2) + C(2,9) + C(2,10)*DV_REER 
 
YGAP = C(3,1)*I(-1) + C(3,2)*I(-2) + C(3,3)*CPI(-1) + C(3,4)*CPI(-2) + C(3,5)*YGAP(-1) + 
C(3,6)*YGAP(-2) + C(3,7)*LREER(-1) + C(3,8)*LREER(-2) + C(3,9) + C(3,10)*DV_REER 
 
LREER = C(4,1)*I(-1) + C(4,2)*I(-2) + C(4,3)*CPI(-1) + C(4,4)*CPI(-2) + C(4,5)*YGAP(-1) + 
C(4,6)*YGAP(-2) + C(4,7)*LREER(-1) + C(4,8)*LREER(-2) + C(4,9) + C(4,10)*DV_REER 
 
                                                
42 It takes a value of one starting from January 2003 till the end of the sample period, and zero otherwise. 
43 In January 2003, the government announced a shift in the exchange rate regime from managed float to a free float exchange 
rate moving according to the market forces. 
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Figure 7: Impulse response functions 
Figure 7 shows the impulse response functions of the 3-month deposits rate, CPI inflation 
rate, output gap, and REER. The output findings are reflected in the following table: 
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Table 3: The Interpretation of the Impulse Response Functions of the Open 
Economy VAR Model 
  Variables Reaction 
 Interest rate CPI Output gap REER 
Interest rate - (-ve) endless reaction 
Small (+ve) 
reaction dies 
after 9 periods 
Small endless 
(+ve) reaction 
after 3 periods 
CPI Small endless (+ve) reaction - 
(+ve) reaction 
after 2 periods 
(-ve) endless 
reaction 
Output gap 
Small (+ve) 
reaction dies 
after 7 periods 
(-ve) endless 
reaction - 
Small (-ve) 
reaction dies 
after 10 periods
Shocks 
REER Small endless (+ve) reaction 
Small endless 
(+ve) reaction
Negligible 
reaction - 
Source: derived by the author. 
 
Similarly; the derived open economy un-structured VAR model is not capable to emulate 
the anticipated theoretical responses of important variables, particularly output gap, to 
interest rate shocks. Where we found that the impact of monetary policy shocks on the 
size and on the direction of change in output gap and in prices is either negligible or 
ambiguous  
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Figure 8: Variance decomposition 
 
Figure 8; for the variance decomposition reflects tiny variation in the included variables 
due to each other, except for the output gap which resulted in around 40 percent variation 
in CPI.  
 
Similarly, the open economy model decisively shows that monetary policy shocks in 
Egypt virtually have no real effect. Also; the monetary policy shocks would only have a 
relatively small effect on the rate of inflation and the REER. This might be attributed to 
the poor quality of Egypt database. 
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ii- The second model: The Augmented Taylor rule 
The Augmented Taylor rule equation discussed in part three is evaluated whether it can to 
be used as a robust rule for conducting monetary policy in case of Egypt or not, using two 
approaches:  
…………(6) 
 
• The backward-looking Taylor rule: where the above Augmented Taylor rule equation 
(6) is estimated using a simple GMM regression technique in order to derive the policy 
parameters, to see whether the existing discretionary framework can be resulted in a rule-
based policy or not?  
 
Table 4: Augmented Taylor Rule estimation output using GMM 
 
Dependent Variable: D_I 
Method: Generalized Method of Moments 
Date: 03/15/09   Time: 21:08 
Sample(adjusted): 1997M10 2007M12 
Included observations: 123 after adjusting endpoints 
Kernel: Bartlett,  Bandwidth: Fixed (4),  Prewhitening 
Simultaneous weighting matrix & coefficient iteration 
Convergence achieved after: 99 weight matrices, 100 total coef 
        iterations 
Instrument list: D_I(-2 TO -8) YGAP(-1 TO -8) D_LREER(-1 TO -8) CPI( 
        -1 TO -8) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
CPI 0.012626 0.003522 3.584886 0.0005 
YGAP 4.16E-09 1.93E-09 2.151940 0.0335 
D_LREER -1.716109 0.680082 -2.523385 0.0130 
DV_REER -0.110847 0.023609 -4.695094 0.0000 
D_I(-1) -0.295654 0.099111 -2.983062 0.0035 
C -0.040031 0.015953 -2.509311 0.0135 
R-squared 0.125728     Mean dependent var -0.029878 
Adjusted R-squared 0.088366     S.D. dependent var 0.176162 
S.E. of regression 0.168198     Sum squared resid 3.310016 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.924052     J-statistic 0.119035 
 
Table 5 belwo; shows the detailed estimation output of equation (6) using GMM estimation 
technique. 
ttttttttt ixrxryyri εγγγγππγπ ++∆+∆+−+−++= −− 15143*2*1 )()(*
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Table 5: The illustrated GMM output of the Augmented Taylor Rule 
Variable Coefficient t-statistics Std. error Prob. 
Natural rate of return r* 8.36 Predetermined constant described above 
Inflation Rate πt 0.0126 3.584886 0.003522 0.0005 
Inflation gap (πt-π*) -0.9874 The coefficient has been derived from the πt  coef.44 
Output gap (yt - yt*) 4.16E-09 2.151940 1.93E-09 0.0335 
LREER ∆xt -1.716 -2.523385 0.680082 0.0130 
Lagged LRRER ∆xt-1 The study ignore it as it is totally insignificant 
Lagged nominal interest rate it-1 -0.2957 -2.983062 0.099111 0.0035 
Dummy variable DV -0.1108 -4.695094 0.023609 0.0000 
Constant C -0.040031 -2.509311 0.015953 0.0135 
 R2 0.125728 
 DW 1.924052 
 J-statistics 0.119035 
Source: derived by the author. 
 
From the above results; although the model gave significant variables with the same 
predetermined theoretical signs (Mohanty and Klau 2004), but it’s obvious from the R2 that 
the model explains only about 12 percent from the total change in the nominal interest rate. 
In addition; some of the coefficients values are relatively low, especially the output gap 
coefficient which is approximately equal to zero. This implies that output gap has 
negligible effect on the nominal interest rate45. 
 
Note that; E-views produces the J-statistic46 which allow to determine whether the model 
has instruments that are orthogonal to the regressors (it does not, however, state whether 
we have weak instruments which is also potentially important). The correct J-test is given 
by multiplying the J-statistic reported in E-views estimation output times the number of 
observations, 123*0.119035= 14.641305. This test is distributed as a Chi-square with (n-s) 
degrees of freedom where n is the number of instruments and s is the number of 
coefficients to estimate. In this case, n=31 and s=6, so our test is χ2 (25) which has a 
critical value at the 10% level of 16.473. Thus these instruments are good to be used at 90 
percent confidence. 
 
Consequently, this model implies that; during the sample period (1997:01 till 2007:12), the 
data can't infer a rule-based regime in case of Egypt. So, only a discretionary regime can be 
figured out in case of Egypt during this period. This may be attributed to different reasons. 
One important reason is the poor quality of Egypt data. Also, the central bank of Egypt 
                                                
44 In equation (6); ∗∗∗ −+=−+=−+ πγπγπγπγπππγπ 11111 )1()( ttttt , assume θγ =+ )1( 1 , then 11 −= θγ . 
45 As interpreted from the previous impulse response functions. 
46 The J-statistic can be used to carry out hypothesis tests from GMM estimation; see E-views help topics. A simple application 
of the J-statistic is to test the validity of over-identifying restrictions when you have more instruments than parameters to 
estimate. Under the null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are satisfied, the J-statistic times the number of 
regression observations is asymptotically chi- square (X2) distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of over-
identifying restrictions. 
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during the study period engaged in achieving different contradicted targets (as stabilizing 
the exchange rate, inflation rate, and domestic output) at the same time.  
 
In addition, during the period January 1997 to June 2005, there was no the so-called policy 
rate in Egypt. Only with the introduction of the corridor system47 in June 2005 the 
overnight interbank rate48 started to play a key role as a policy rate. As a result, if a study 
can use the overnight interbank rate since June 2005 forward, it might get better consistent 
results49.  
 
• The forward-looking Taylor rule: where the nominal interest rate is going to be 
calculated, using the estimated structural parameters derived from the above equation (6), 
under different scenarios regarding the target inflation (once at 4 percent and another at 7 
percent50) to see whether the CBE can relay on Taylor rule as a guidance for policymakers 
discretionary decisions in the future or not. The paper picks up a random date to calculate 
the above scenarios (July 2007) by substituting the selected data in the estimated 
augmented Taylor rule equation above. Before proceeding, it should be noted that 
consequently to the low interpretation power of the above model (R2 = 12 percent), the 
following scenarios might be ambiguous. 
Table 6: the forward looking Taylor rule scenario 
Actual Inflation 
rate in July 2007 
Targeted 
Inflation rate in 
July 2007 
Actual Nominal 
Interest rate in 
July 2007 
Expected Nominal 
Interest rate in 
July 2007 
4 percent 2.24 percent 7.62 percent 7 percent 6.1 percent 5.21 percent 
Source: derived by the author. 
 
The above results revels unrealistic output, since the used model is explaining only around 
12 percent from the total change in the nominal interest rate.  
 
Finally; the paper shows that during the sample period, it couldn’t deduct a rule based 
regime in case of Egypt, which may be attributed to the poor quality of data. In addition, 
the absence of a true policy rate51  to be used in the study, may have affected the model. 
                                                
47 It specifies both an overnight deposit and lending rates, in which the overnight interbank rate moves freely in between them 
according to market forces. 
48 Introduced in December 2001 (CBE data). 
49 The paper couldn’t use the overnight interbank rate as a policy rate- instead of the 3-month deposits rate- while estimating the 
interest rate rule in case of Egypt; since the CBE started to use the overnight interbank rate as a policy rate only in June 2005 by 
announcing the application of the Corridor system. So the number of observations available will be 31 observations, which is 
too few to build up a comprehensive model. But; we performed this exercise with taking into consideration the short sample 
estimation restrictions. For the estimation output, check appendix B page 192.  
50 These rates are arbitrarily selected. 
51 Reacting to market forces, as the overnight interbank rate starting from June 2005. 
 43
V. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 
“Having looked at monetary policy from both sides now, I can testify that central 
banking in practice is as much art as science. Nonetheless, while practicing this dark art, I 
have always found the science quite useful.”52 Alan S. Blinder 
 
 During the thesis work, the main intend was examining the validity of using Taylor 
rule as a robust rule for conducting monetary policy in case of Egypt (during the period 
1997 – 2007), through testing the trueness of two main hypotheses:  
First, is the presence of a real significant effect of the monetary policy (expressed by the 
policy rate) on the real economy (represented by output and inflation).  
Second, we could deduct an interest rate rule during the period of the study in case of 
Egypt. 
 
 In this contest, the study passed several stages before concluding the results of the in 
hand exercise. First, the paper highlighted both the foundation and theoretical background 
of the interest rate rules. In which, it tried to draw the road map for building up a country’s 
own interest rate rule, through providing the perquisite theoretical infrastructure and 
enhanced it with the main quantitative issues to be regarded while applying the exercise 
practically. Second, the final step before the empirical exercise on Egypt was to highlight 
the historical background for conducting monetary policy in Egypt during the period of the 
study. Where, it provided the study with the necessary guidelines -regarding the 
characteristics of the Egyptian economy- while building up the model. 
 
After building up the model for Egypt during 1997 to 2007; using the acquired 
perquisite knowledge; the study concluded the following:  
 
• The study results reveal that; the impact of monetary policy shocks on real output was 
negligible and ambiguous, respectively. In addition, the study concludes that policy 
shocks have a slight impact only on both the inflation rate and exchange rate with 
almost no real effect.  Naturally, this does not mean that the monetary policy is not 
important. What it means, however, is that the effect of monetary policy on the level of 
real output and on the rate of economic growth in the long run is limited by its capacity 
to achieve long-run price stability. This supports the Egyptian case; where during the 
period under consideration, the Central Bank of Egypt has targeted a mix of conflicting 
targets as stabilizing inflation, exchange rate and promoting output growth, which 
dispersed the Central Bank of Egypt from its real objective (price stability). 
• We estimated the Augmented Taylor-type interest rate feedback rule à la Taylor (2001) 
as part of a system for output gap, inflation, exchange rate and nominal interest rate 
                                                
52 Blinder 1997, p. 17. 
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determination. The estimation model zoomed in on the period from 1997 to the end of 
2007. The study findings disclose that the discretionary monetary regime in Egypt 
during the period of the study was inconsistent with rule-like policy outcomes. This 
might be attributed to a bundle of factors, mainly the absence of a true policy rate  
during the period of the study, may have affected the model output, in addition to the 
poor quality of data  
 
Based on the previous conclusions, our recommendations are expressed in the 
following: 
The paper sheds light on the prospects for monetary decision making by a policy rule as a 
substitute for the current discretionary decision making regime, since Egypt has a long 
history of monetary policy making by discretion rather than by rules.  
 
The disadvantages of such a system are well known. Discretionary policy in Egypt usually 
has had limited success—at least since the 1990's—in achieving a mix of occasionally 
conflicting economic and monetary objectives including inflation and output stabilization, 
motivating real GDP growth, interest rate smoothing, and exchange rate stability. 
Counterfactual policy oriented scenarios suggest that it might be possible to improve the 
capacity of the CBE in achieving a successful monetary policy, initially by focusing on a 
single main target (stabilizing inflation) at a time, which was settled by the Law 88 for 
year 2003 regarding the CBE work. As well as, following a constrained discretionary 
regime through abiding by policy intervention measures that can appropriately influence 
the responses of the short-term nominal interest rate to deviations of inflation from its 
target value and of real output from its trend. 
 
Despite; failing to show a significant rule based monetary regime during the sample period, 
but in line with the mainstream literature, we support forward implementation of the 
constrained discretion framework by the CBE that finds a middle ground between the pure 
discretion and the strict rules approaches supported by Taylor 1993, using the Overnight 
Interbank Rate as a proxy of the policy rate. It also permits the decision makers to remain 
committed to some target via a policy rule but at the same time allows sufficient flexibility 
to respond to unanticipated adverse shocks to the economy and to disturbances in the 
money markets.  
 
The literature shows that constrained discretion is closely related to the inflation-targeting 
framework, which involves the idea of employing a policy rule. Similarly, since the 
Central Bank of Egypt is building up the perquisite infrastructure for adopting inflation 
targeting, the use of the constrained discretion regime would enhance both the credibility 
and transparency of the Central Bank of Egypt. 
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 secnerefeR
 اﻟﻤﺮاﺟﻊ ﺑﺎﻟﻠﻐﺔ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ: أوًﻻ
 :اﻟﻜﺘﺐ
ﻣﺤﻤﺪ إﺑﺮاهﻴﻢ ﻣﻨﺼﻮر، دار اﻟﻤﺮﻳﺦ، اﻟﺮﻳﺎض، اﻟﻤﻤﻠﻜﺔ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ .، ﺗﺮﺟﻤﺔ داﻹﻗﺘﺼﺎد اﻟﻜﻠﻰ اﻟﻨﻈﺮﻳﺔ و اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺎت ، (8891)أﺑﺪﺟﺎن، ﻣﺎﻳﻜﻞ 
 .ﻟﺴﻌﻮدﻳﺔا
 
 .، اﻟﻘﺎهﺮةﺗﻌﺪﻳﻼﺗﻪو 7591 ﻟﺴﻨﺔ 361ﻗﺎﻧﻮن اﻟﺒﻨﻮك و اﻹﺋﺘﻤﺎن رﻗﻢ اﻟﺒﻨﻚ اﻟﻤﺮآﺰي اﻟﻤﺼﺮي، 
 
 .، ﺻﻨﺪوق اﻟﻨﻘﺪ اﻟﺪوﻟﻰ، واﺷﻨﻄﻦدراﺳﺔ ﺗﻄﺒﻴﻘﻴﺔ ﻋﻦ ﻣﺼﺮ: ﺗﺤﻠﻴﻞ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﺎت اﻹﻗﺘﺼﺎد اﻟﻜﻠﻰ ، (7991)اﻟﺨﻮرى، ﺳﻤﻴﺮ، و أﺧﺮون
 
 .، إﺗﺤﺎد اﻟﻤﺼﺎرف اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ، ﺑﻴﺮوت، ﻟﺒﻨﺎن ﻳﻴﺪ و اﻟﻤﻌﺎرﺿﺔإﺳﺘﻘﻼﻟﻴﺔ اﻟﺒﻨﻮك اﻟﻤﺮآﺰﻳﺔ ﺑﻴﻦ اﻟﺘﺄ ، (4991)ﺣﺸﺎد، ﻧﺒﻴﻞ
 
  .، إﺗﺤﺎد اﻟﻤﺼﺎرف اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ  اﻟﻤﺼﺮف اﻟﻤﺮآﺰى و اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ ﻓﻰ اﻟﺘﺸﺮﻳﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻰ واﻟﺪوﻟﻰ ،(8991)ﻋﻴﺎش، ﻏﺴﺎن
 
 .،اﻟﺪار اﻟﻤﺼﺮﻳﺔ اﻟﻠﺒﻨﺎﻧﻴﺔ، اﻟﻄﺒﻌﺔ اﻷوﻟﻰ اﻟﻨﻈﺮﻳﺔ و اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺎت اﻟﻨﻘﺪﻳﺔ، (9891)ﻣﻌﺘﻮق، ﺳﻬﻴﺮ ﻣﺤﻤﻮد
 
 :رﻳﺎت و اﻟﺮﺳﺎﺋﻞ اﻟﻌﻠﻤﻴﺔاﻟﻤﻘﺎﻻت و اﻟﺪو
-514 اﻟﻌﺪدان ﻣﺠﻠﺔ ﻣﺼﺮ اﻟﻤﻌﺎﺻﺮة،، (9891)،" اﻟﺘﺸﺎﺑﻚ اﻟﻤﺎﻟﻰ واﻟﻨﻘﺪى و ﻓﻌﺎﻟﻴﺔ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺔ واﻹﻗﺘﺼﺎد ﻓﻰ ﻣﺼﺮ "أﺑﻮ اﻟﻌﻴﻮن، ﻣﺤﻤﻮد،
 .  إﺑﺮﻳﻞ– ﻳﻨﺎﻳﺮ 614
 
 ﺳﻠﺴﻠﺔ أوراق اﻟﻌﻤﻞ، ،(3002)،"ﺗﻄﻮرات اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺔ اﻟﻨﻘﺪﻳﺔ ﻓﻰ ﺟﻤﻬﻮرﻳﺔ ﻣﺼﺮ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ و اﻟﺘﻮﺟﻬﺎت اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻘﺒﻠﻴﺔ" أﺑﻮ اﻟﻌﻴﻮن، ﻣﺤﻤﻮد،
 (.87)، ورﻗﺔ ﻋﻤﻞ رﻗﻢ اﻟﻤﺮآﺰ اﻟﻤﺼﺮي ﻟﻠﺪراﺳﺎت اﻹﻗﺘﺼﺎدﻳﺔ 
 
ﻣﺪﻳﺮﻳﺔ اﻟﺒﺤﻮث و اﻟﻤﺠﻠﺔ و ، (2002)،"ﻣﺼﺮ ﻗﺼﺔ ﻧﺠﺎح ﺣﻘﻴﻘﻴﺔ :  أﺿﻮاء ﻋﻠﻲ دوﻟﺔ و ﻗﻄﺎع ﻣﺼﺮﻓﻲ " إﺗﺤﺎد اﻟﻤﺼﺎرف اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ، 
  .552،  ﺑﻴﺮوت، ﻟﺒﻨﺎن، اﻟﻌﺪد اﻟﻤﺆﻟﻔﺎت
 
 اﻟﺘﻀﺨﻢ، ﺁﻟﻴﺎت، آﺘﺎب ﻣﺆﺗﻤﺮ (2991)،"ﻟﺘﻀﺨﻢ ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل اﻟﺘﻮﺳﻊ اﻟﻨﻘﺪى وﺳﻌﺮ اﻟﻔﺎﺋﺪة  اﺁﻟﻴﺎتﺗﻌﻘﻴﺐ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺑﺤﺚ " أﺣﻤﺪ ﺻﻘﺮ، ﺻﻘﺮ
 .، آﻠﻴﺔ اﻹﻗﺘﺼﺎد و اﻟﻌﻠﻮم اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ، ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ اﻟﻘﺎهﺮة ﻣﺮآﺰ اﻟﺒﺤﻮث واﻟﺪرﺳﺎت اﻹﻗﺘﺼﺎدﻳﺔ واﻟﻤﺎﻟﻴﺔ 
 
، ﻣﺠﻠﺔ (2002)، "2ﻠﺠﻨﺔ ﺑﺎزل ﻣﺸﺮوع اﻟﻘﺮارات اﻟﺠﺪﻳﺪة ﻟ : ﺧﻼﺻﺔ ﺑﺪراﺳﺔ اﻷﺛﺮ "اﻷآﺎدﻳﻤﻴﺔ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﻌﻠﻮم اﻟﻤﺎﻟﻴﺔ و اﻟﻤﺼﺮﻓﻴﺔ، 
 .  ، اﻟﺴﻨﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﺷﺮة3، اﻟﻤﺠﻠﺪ اﻟﻌﺎﺷﺮ، اﻟﻌﺪد ﻣﺮآﺰ اﻟﺒﺤﻮث اﻟﻤﺎﻟﻴﺔ و اﻟﻤﺼﺮﻓﻴﺔ اﻟﺪراﺳﺎت اﻟﻤﺎﻟﻴﺔ و اﻟﻤﺼﺮﻓﻴﺔ،  
 
 .أﻋﺪاد ﻣﺘﻔﺮﻗﺔ،" اﻟﺮﺑﻊ ﺳﻨﻮﻳﺔ اﻟﻨﺸﺮة اﻹﻗﺘﺼﺎدﻳﺔ " ،اﻟﺒﻨﻚ اﻷهﻠﻲ اﻟﻤﺼﺮي 
 
 .، أﻋﺪاد ﻣﺘﻔﺮﻗﺔ" اﻟﺘﻘﺎرﻳﺮ اﻟﺴﻨﻮﻳﺔ  " ،اﻟﺒﻨﻚ اﻟﻤﺮآﺰي اﻟﻤﺼﺮي 
 
 .، أﻋﺪاد ﻣﺘﻔﺮﻗﺔ" اﻟﻤﺠﻠﺔ اﻹﻗﺘﺼﺎدﻳﺔ اﻟﺮﺑﻊ ﺳﻨﻮﻳﺔ  " ،اﻟﺒﻨﻚ اﻟﻤﺮآﺰي اﻟﻤﺼﺮي 
 
 .، أﻋﺪاد ﻣﺘﻔﺮﻗﺔ " اﻟﻨﺸﺮة اﻟﺸﻬﺮﻳﺔ " ،اﻟﺒﻨﻚ اﻟﻤﺮآﺰي اﻟﻤﺼﺮي 
 
 . ﺗﻘﺮﻳﺮ اﻟﺘﻄﻮرات اﻟﻨﻘﺪﻳﺔ واﻹﺋﺘﻤﺎﻧﻴﺔ واﻟﻤﺼﺮﻓﻴﺔ أﻋﺪاد ﻣﺘﻔﺮﻗﺔ  " ،اﻟﺒﻨﻚ اﻟﻤﺮآﺰي اﻟﻤﺼﺮي 
 
 .ﺘﻤﺎﻧﻴﺔ أﻋﺪاد ﻣﺘﻔﺮﻗﺔ ﺋﻌﺐ ﻋﻦ اﻷوﺿﺎع اﻟﻨﻘﺪﻳﺔ واﻹ ﺗﻘﺮﻳﺮ ﻣﻘﺪم ﻟﻤﺠﻠﺲ اﻟﺸ " ،اﻟﺒﻨﻚ اﻟﻤﺮآﺰي اﻟﻤﺼﺮي 
 
 .7891، اﻟﻌﺪد اﻷول، "78 /68 -37 اﻟﺘﻐﻴﺮات اﻟﻬﻴﻜﻠﻴﺔ ﻓﻰ اﻹﻗﺘﺼﺎد اﻟﻤﺼﺮى ﺧﻼل اﻟﻔﺘﺮة  " ،اﻟﺒﻨﻚ اﻟﻤﺮآﺰي اﻟﻤﺼﺮي 
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 . ﻳﻞإﺑﺮ-693 اﻟﻌﺪد ﻣﺠﻠﺔ ﻣﺼﺮ اﻟﻤﻌﺎﺻﺮة،، (4891)،"2891-0591 اﻟﺘﻄﻮرات واﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺎت اﻟﻨﻘﺪﻳﺔ ﻓﻰ ﻣﺼﺮ "،ﻌﺒﺪ، ﻣاﻟﺠﺎرﺣﻰ 
 
، ﻣﻜﺘﺒﺔ اﻟﺒﻨﻚ ﻣﺤﺎﺿﺮات ﻣﻌﻬﺪ اﻟﺪراﺳﺎت اﻟﻤﺼﺮﻓﻴﺔ ، "إﺳﺘﻘﻼﻟﻴﺔ اﻟﺒﻨﻚ اﻟﻤﺮآﺰي و أﺛﺮﻩ ﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺔ اﻟﻨﻘﺪﻳﺔ " ،(3991)اﻟﺤﻤﺎﻗﻲ، ﻳﻤﻦ 
 . اﻟﻤﺮآﺰي اﻟﻤﺼﺮي، اﻟﻘﺎهﺮة 
 
ﺨﺪام ﺑﺈﺳﺘ)ﺗﻄﻮﻳﺮ دور اﻟﺒﻨﻚ اﻟﻤﺮآﺰي اﻟﻤﺼﺮي ﻓﻲ رﺳﻢ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺎت اﻟﻨﻘﺪﻳﺔ و اﻹﺋﺘﻤﺎﻧﻴﺔ " ،(2002)اﻟﺸﺎﻓﻌﻲ،  ﻣﺤﻤﺪ ﻋﺒﺪ اﻟﺮﺣﻴﻢ
 . ، اﻟﺒﻨﻚ اﻟﻤﺮآﺰي اﻟﻤﺼﺮي، اﻟﻘﺎهﺮة وﺣﺪة اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺔ اﻟﻨﻘﺪﻳﺔ ، ("اﻷﺳﺎﻟﻴﺐ اﻟﻤﺒﺎﺷﺮة و اﻟﻐﻴﺮ ﻣﺒﺎﺷﺮة ﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﻨﻘﺪ و اﻹﺋﺘﻤﺎن 
 
، ﻣﺤﺎﺿﺮات اﻟﻤﻌﻬﺪ اﻟﻤﺼﺮﻓﻰ ، " واﻹﺋﺘﻤﺎﻧﻴﺔ  اﻟﻨﻘﺪﻳﺔﺎت اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳرﺳﻢدور اﻟﺒﻨﻚ اﻟﻤﺮآﺰي ﻓﻲ " ،(3002)اﻟﺸﺎﻓﻌﻲ، ﻣﺤﻤﺪ ﻋﺒﺪ اﻟﺮﺣﻴﻢ 
 .ﺮةاﻟﺒﻨﻚ اﻟﻤﺮآﺰي اﻟﻤﺼﺮي، اﻟﻘﺎه 
 
، ﺳﻠﺴﻠﺔ ﺑﺤﻮث و ﻣﻨﺎﻗﺸﺎت "اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺎت اﻟﻨﻘﺪﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺪول اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ" ،(6691)ﻲ،ﻣﻌﺒﺪ، و ﻋﺒﺪ اﻟﻮهﺎب، ﻧﺒﻴﻞﺣ اﻟﺼﺎدق، ﺗﻮﻓﻴﻖ، و اﻟﺠﺎر
 .، اﻹﻣﺎرات اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ اﻟﻤﺘﺤﺪة ﻲأﺑﻮ ﻇﺒ ﻣﻌﻬﺪ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺎت اﻹﻗﺘﺼﺎدﻳﺔ، -ﺻﻨﺪوق اﻟﻨﻘﺪ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ ﺣﻠﻘﺎت اﻟﻌﻤﻞ، 
 
آﻠﻴﺔ ﻗﺴﻢ اﻹﻗﺘﺼﺎد، -، ﺳﻠﺴﻠﺔ أوراق ﺑﺤﺜﻴﺔ " و إﺳﺘﻘﻼﻟﻴﺔ اﻟﺒﻨﻚ اﻟﻤﺮآﺰي ﻓﻲ ﻣﺼﺮ ﺣﻮل اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺔ اﻟﻨﻘﺪﻳﺔ " ،(0002)اﻟﻐﻨﺪور، أﺣﻤﺪ
 .، ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ اﻟﻘﺎهﺮةاﻹﻗﺘﺼﺎد و اﻟﻌﻠﻮم اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ 
 
 .، اﻟﻌﺪد اﻷول43، اﻟﺴﻨﺔ (0991)،"اﻟﻨﺸﺮة اﻹﻗﺘﺼﺎدﻳﺔ " ،ﺑﻨﻚ ﻣﺼﺮ
 
ﻣﺤﺎﺿﺮات ﻣﻌﻬﺪ اﻟﺪراﺳﺎت ، "ﺟﻴﻪ اﻹﺋﺘﻤﺎنأدوات اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺔ اﻟﻨﻘﺪﻳﺔ و اﻹﺋﺘﻤﺎﻧﻴﺔ و دورهﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺗﻮ" ،(8891)ﺧﻠﻴﻞ، رﺟﺎء ﻋﺒﺪ اﻟﻤﻨﻌﻢ 
 .، ﻣﻜﺘﺒﺔ اﻟﺒﻨﻚ اﻟﻤﺮآﺰي اﻟﻤﺼﺮي، اﻟﻘﺎهﺮة اﻟﻤﺼﺮﻓﻴﺔ 
 
ﻣﻊ دراﺳﺔ اﻟﺤﺎﻟﺔ اﻟﻤﺼﺮﻳﺔ ﻓﻰ ﻇﻞ )دور اﻷدوات اﻟﻜﻤﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﺒﻨﻚ اﻟﻤﺮآﺰى ﻓﻰ ﻓﻌﺎﻟﻴﺔ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺔ اﻟﻨﻘﺪﻳﺔ "، (5002)راﺟﺢ، راﻧﻴﺎ ﻋﺒﺪ اﻟﻤﻨﻌﻢ 
آﻠﻴﺔ اﻹﻗﺘﺼﺎد و اﻟﻌﻠﻮم -، ﻗﺴﻢ اﻹﻗﺘﺼﺎد رﺳﺎﻟﺔ ﻣﺎﺟﺴﺘﻴﺮ ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﻨﺸﻮرة، "، ("ﻘﺪاﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮن اﻟﺠﺪﻳﺪ ﻟﻠﺒﻨﻚ اﻟﻤﺮآﺰى واﻟﺠﻬﺎز اﻟﻤﺼﺮﻓﻰ واﻟﻨ 
 .اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ، ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ اﻟﻘﺎهﺮة
 
-، ﻗﺴﻢ اﻹﻗﺘﺼﺎد رﺳﺎﻟﺔ دآﺘﻮراﻩ ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﻨﺸﻮرة ، "5891 و ﺣﺘﻰ 0791اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺔ اﻟﻨﻘﺪﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺼﺮ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻔﺘﺮة ﻣﻦ " ،(9891)رﺿﻮان، ﻋﺰﻩ 
 .آﻠﻴﺔ اﻹﻗﺘﺼﺎد و اﻟﻌﻠﻮم اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ، ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ اﻟﻘﺎهﺮة
 
آﻠﻴﺔ اﻹﻗﺘﺼﺎد و اﻟﻌﻠﻮم اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ، -، ﻗﺴﻢ اﻹﻗﺘﺼﺎد رﺳﺎﻟﺔ ﻣﺎﺟﺴﺘﻴﺮ ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﻨﺸﻮرة ، "اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺔ اﻹﺋﺘﻤﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺼﺮ" ،(7791)ﺳﻠﻴﻤﺎن، ﻋﻼ
 .ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ اﻟﻘﺎهﺮة
 
، "اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺎت اﻹﻗﺘﺼﺎدﻳﺔ اﻟﻜﻠﻴﺔ و دور اﻟﺒﻨﻚ اﻟﻤﺮآﺰي اﻟﻤﺼﺮي ﻓﻲ رﺳﻢ و ﺗﻨﻔﻴﺬ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺔ اﻟﻨﻘﺪﻳﺔ " ،(1002)ﻋﺒﺪ اﻟﻌﺰﻳﺰ،ﻣﺤﻤﻮد 
 . ، اﻟﺒﻨﻚ اﻟﻤﺮآﺰي اﻟﻤﺼﺮي، اﻟﻘﺎهﺮة ت اﻟﻤﻌﻬﺪ اﻟﻤﺼﺮﻓﻲﻣﺤﺎﺿﺮا 
 
رﺳﺎﻟﺔ ﻣﺎﺟﺴﺘﻴﺮ ﻏﻴﺮ ،  "6891-4791دراﺳﺔ ﺗﺤﻠﻴﻠﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﻔﺘﺮة -اﻟﺪور اﻟﺮﻗﺎﺑﻲ ﻟﻠﺒﻨﻚ اﻟﻤﺮآﺰي اﻟﻤﺼﺮي " ،(9891)ﻋﺒﺪ اﻟﻠﻄﻴﻒ، ﻧﺎهﺪ
 .آﻠﻴﺔ اﻹﻗﺘﺼﺎد و اﻟﻌﻠﻮم اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ، ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ اﻟﻘﺎهﺮة-، ﻗﺴﻢ اﻹﻗﺘﺼﺎد ﻣﻨﺸﻮرة
 
رﺳﺎﻟﺔ ﻣﺎﺟﺴﺘﻴﺮ ، "ﻓﻌﺎﻟﻴﺔ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺔ اﻟﻨﻘﺪﻳﺔ ﻓﻰ اﻹﻗﺘﺼﺎد اﻟﻤﺼﺮى ﻓﻰ ﻇﻞ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﺔ اﻹﻧﻔﺘﺎح اﻹﻗﺘﺼﺎدى " ،(9891) ﻓﺆاد أﺣﻤﺪ، ﻋﺼﺎم اﻟﺪﻳﻦ
 . آﻠﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﺠﺎرة، ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ ﻋﻴﻦ ﺷﻤﺲ ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﻨﺸﻮرة،
 
، ﻟﺠﻨﺔ اﻟﺸﺌﻮن ﺳﻠﺴﻠﺔ ﺗﻘﺎرﻳﺮ ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻟﺸﻮرى، (2991)،"اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺔ اﻟﻨﻘﺪﻳﺔ و اﻹﺋﺘﻤﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺟﻤﻬﻮرﻳﺔ ﻣﺼﺮ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ " ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻟﺸﻮرى،
  .4ﻴﺔ و اﻹﻗﺘﺼﺎدﻳﺔ، اﻟﺘﻘﺮﻳﺮ رﻗﻢ اﻟﻤﺎﻟ
 
 . ﻓﺒﺮاﻳﺮ –، ﻳﻨﺎﻳﺮ 72ﻣﺼﺮ، اﻟﻌﺪد  ﺑﻨﻮك إﺗﺤﺎد ، ﻣﺠﻠﺔ اﻟﺒﻨﻮك، "إﺳﺘﻘﻼﻟﻴﺔ اﻟﺒﻨﻚ اﻟﻤﺮآﺰى" ،(1002)ﻣﻌﺘﻮق، ﺳﻬﻴﺮ
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ﺪﻤﺣأ ،ﻰﺤﺼﻧ)1992(، "تﺎﻴﻟﺁ ىﺪﻘﻨﻟا ﻊﺳﻮﺘﻟا لﻼﺧ ﻦﻣ ﻢﺨﻀﺘﻟا " ﺮﻤﺗﺆﻣ بﺎﺘآ،تﺎﻴﻟﺁ ،ﻢﺨﻀﺘﻟا  ﺔﻳدﺎﺼﺘﻗﻹا تﺎﺳرﺪﻟاو ثﻮﺤﺒﻟا ﺰآﺮﻣ
ﺔﻴﻟﺎﻤﻟاو ةﺮهﺎﻘﻟا ﺔﻌﻣﺎﺟ ،ﺔﻴﺳﺎﻴﺴﻟا مﻮﻠﻌﻟا و دﺎﺼﺘﻗﻹا ﺔﻴﻠآ ،. 
 
 ﺪﻤﺣأ ،ﻰﺤﺼﻧ)1996(، " ﻊﻀﺨﺗ ﺔﻳﺪﻘﻨﻟا تﺎﺳﺎﻴﺴﻟاوتﺎﻴﻟﻵًﺎﻀﻳأ قﻮﺴﻟا "،كﻮﻨﺒﻟا ﺔﻠﺠﻣ ،  دﺎﺤﺗإ كﻮﻨﺑ  ﻮﻴﻟﻮﻳ ،ﺚﻟﺎﺜﻟا دﺪﻌﻟا ،ﺮﺼﻣ– 
ﺲﻄﺴﻏأ. 
 
 ﺪﺒﻋ ﻰﻔﻄﺼﻣ ،ﻢﺷﺎهفوءﺮﻟا)2001(، "اﺮﻴﻐﺘﻤﻟا ﻢهأ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺔﻳﺪﻘﻨﻟا و ﺔﻴﻟﺎﻤﻟا ﺔﺳﺎﻴﺴﻟا رﺎﺛأ سﺎﻴﻗ لﻼﺧ يﺮﺼﻤﻟا دﺎﺼﺘﻗﻹا ﻰﻓ ﺔﻴﻠﻜﻟا ت
 ةﺮﺘﻔﻟا1974-90/91ﺔﻴﻠﺒﻘﺘﺴﻤﻟا ﺎﻬﺗﺎهﺎﺠﺗإ و " ، ﺔﻟﺎﺳرﻩارﻮﺘآدةرﻮﺸﻨﻣ ﺮﻴﻏ  دﺎﺼﺘﻗﻹا ﻢﺴﻗ ،– ةﺎﻨﻗ ﺔﻌﻣﺎﺟ ،ﺔﻴﻠﻴﻋﺎﻤﺳﻹا ةرﺎﺠﺗ ﺔﻴﻠآ 
ﺲﻳﻮﺴﻟا. 
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Appendix A: Statistical Appendix  
 
Table 1: Data spread sheet 
obs I CPI IP LREER YPOTEN DV_REER 
1997M01 9.900000 5.682159 19679168 107.6100 21485013 0.000000 
1997M02 10.10000 5.401670 20888811 90.78000 21629396 0.000000 
1997M03 10.10000 5.546175 21862941 90.23000 21773654 0.000000 
1997M04 10.05000 5.365045 22601558 88.85000 21917609 0.000000 
1997M05 10.00000 4.874126 23104662 90.39000 22061091 0.000000 
1997M06 9.850000 4.756596 23372253 90.18000 22203978 0.000000 
1997M07 9.800000 3.614362 23098539 88.25000 22346218 0.000000 
1997M08 9.800000 3.784377 23124448 88.56000 22487841 0.000000 
1997M09 9.675000 3.683959 23144186 88.68000 22628931 0.000000 
1997M10 9.600000 3.955979 23079148 89.60000 22769614 0.000000 
1997M11 9.600000 3.929093 23145503 87.65000 22910054 0.000000 
1997M12 9.550000 3.985773 23264644 86.54000 23050434 0.000000 
1998M01 9.650000 3.755670 23515446 86.12000 23190954 0.000000 
1998M02 9.500000 3.784732 23681003 86.25000 23331831 0.000000 
1998M03 9.650000 3.392834 23840188 85.37000 23473302 0.000000 
1998M04 9.500000 3.590081 24207470 85.60000 23615630 0.000000 
1998M05 9.350000 3.866250 24193064 84.34000 23759101 0.000000 
1998M06 9.000000 4.084345 24011438 83.64000 23904046 0.000000 
1998M07 9.550000 4.268824 22998081 83.60000 24050822 0.000000 
1998M08 9.400000 4.347874 22980397 83.77000 24199796 0.000000 
1998M09 9.150000 4.693135 23293874 85.79000 24351262 0.000000 
1998M10 9.050000 4.402520 24744069 88.46000 24505428 0.000000 
1998M11 9.550000 3.763398 25115703 86.79000 24662429 0.000000 
1998M12 9.000000 3.574549 25214331 88.24000 24822417 0.000000 
1999M01 9.150000 3.835778 24458856 87.56000 24985575 0.000000 
1999M02 9.250000 3.736612 24447297 85.90000 25152113 0.000000 
1999M03 9.200000 3.818856 24598554 85.25000 25322206 0.000000 
1999M04 9.250000 3.259852 25139646 85.21000 25495978 0.000000 
1999M05 9.070000 2.797232 25446276 84.37000 25673504 0.000000 
1999M06 9.140000 2.877062 25745460 83.59000 25854834 0.000000 
1999M07 9.340000 2.874662 26145620 85.55000 26040001 0.000000 
1999M08 9.270000 2.864574 26348596 85.59000 26229034 0.000000 
1999M09 9.310000 2.413766 26462811 86.66000 26421964 0.000000 
1999M10 9.100000 2.323486 25966756 86.34000 26618835 0.000000 
1999M11 9.200000 3.022472 26294578 85.31000 26819691 0.000000 
1999M12 9.330000 3.192456 26924769 85.34000 27024533 0.000000 
2000M01 9.380000 2.921020 28587579 83.96000 27233323 0.000000 
2000M02 9.400000 3.001734 29274821 83.27000 27446018 0.000000 
2000M03 9.300000 2.994031 29716744 83.69000 27662668 0.000000 
2000M04 9.600000 2.901081 29518248 82.16000 27883450 0.000000 
2000M05 9.500000 2.806113 29765860 82.36000 28108685 0.000000 
2000M06 9.300000 2.542375 30064481 84.14000 28338806 0.000000 
2000M07 9.300000 2.793719 30688490 82.73000 28574362 0.000000 
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2000M08 9.400000 2.616509 30883339 82.28000 28816020 0.000000 
2000M09 9.700000 2.525662 30923410 82.39000 29064597 0.000000 
2000M10 9.500000 2.523029 30594001 81.69000 29321052 0.000000 
2000M11 9.600000 2.346795 30485541 85.64000 29586471 0.000000 
2000M12 9.500000 2.257233 30383328 87.52000 29862032 0.000000 
2001M01 9.400000 2.588115 30048575 90.27000 30148973 0.000000 
2001M02 9.500000 2.331869 30137948 90.28000 30448570 0.000000 
2001M03 9.700000 2.159416 30412659 87.75000 30762089 0.000000 
2001M04 9.300000 2.321497 31242641 88.13000 31090779 0.000000 
2001M05 9.500000 2.150785 31610580 87.83000 31435859 0.000000 
2001M06 9.400000 2.231617 31886408 87.02000 31798565 0.000000 
2001M07 9.600000 2.224573 31913121 87.48000 32180139 0.000000 
2001M08 9.400000 2.137199 32122481 90.68000 32581834 0.000000 
2001M09 9.400000 2.134686 32357482 96.48000 33004881 0.000000 
2001M10 9.500000 2.296943 32748335 95.28000 33450482 0.000000 
2001M11 9.500000 2.211814 32936964 93.95000 33919791 0.000000 
2001M12 9.300000 2.452894 33053577 100.2900 34413915 0.000000 
2002M01 9.500000 2.440900 32399379 99.07000 34933893 0.000000 
2002M02 9.500000 2.603561 32896060 99.03000 35480669 0.000000 
2002M03 9.500000 2.763987 33844823 99.59000 36055011 0.000000 
2002M04 9.600000 2.431026 36152036 101.9800 36657508 0.000000 
2002M05 9.500000 2.752789 37325190 103.6500 37288594 0.000000 
2002M06 9.400000 2.748340 38270653 106.8400 37948670 0.000000 
2002M07 9.500000 2.578397 39499420 106.1800 38638137 0.000000 
2002M08 9.400000 2.657302 39606251 106.6000 39357422 0.000000 
2002M09 9.300000 2.973431 39102141 105.8500 40107008 0.000000 
2002M10 9.300000 2.806953 35586031 105.6700 40887398 0.000000 
2002M11 8.800000 3.125061 35660837 105.3900 41699023 0.000000 
2002M12 8.700000 2.953064 36925497 108.0000 42541949 0.000000 
2003M01 8.200000 2.938006 41881667 130.4600 43415818 1.000000 
2003M02 8.000000 3.092843 43649797 133.4500 44319887 1.000000 
2003M03 8.100000 3.559995 44731542 138.1800 45253303 1.000000 
2003M04 8.300000 3.955869 43709962 142.6700 46215168 1.000000 
2003M05 8.400000 3.940271 44481639 147.7200 47204547 1.000000 
2003M06 8.500000 4.012240 45629634 147.0300 48220331 1.000000 
2003M07 8.400000 4.399014 48399600 147.9100 49261224 1.000000 
2003M08 8.400000 4.864397 49365991 146.3700 50325747 1.000000 
2003M09 8.300000 5.089427 49774461 150.4800 51412363 1.000000 
2003M10 8.100000 5.721468 49017821 150.3300 52519468 1.000000 
2003M11 8.100000 6.023064 48765838 150.4800 53645343 1.000000 
2003M12 7.900000 6.398865 48411325 153.8700 54788029 1.000000 
2004M01 7.900000 7.938897 44887490 151.3700 55945224 1.000000 
2004M02 7.800000 9.809130 46628008 148.7700 57114187 1.000000 
2004M03 7.700000 10.89319 50566089 147.0600 58291407 1.000000 
2004M04 7.700000 12.21451 63293833 143.1400 59472645 1.000000 
2004M05 7.700000 11.87607 66682962 144.4800 60653126 1.000000 
2004M06 7.700000 11.70988 67325577 145.0800 61828340 1.000000 
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2004M07 7.700000 11.98275 56542950 142.8700 62994195 1.000000 
2004M08 7.700000 11.13971 58201584 144.2100 64146983 1.000000 
2004M09 7.700000 11.91432 63622749 143.4000 65282545 1.000000 
2004M10 7.700000 12.59543 81332209 144.7100 66396312 1.000000 
2004M11 7.700000 11.67080 87884116 147.8500 67483598 1.000000 
2004M12 7.700000 11.35190 91804233 146.7800 68540755 1.000000 
2005M01 7.600000 9.501208 92977070 136.5900 69565551 1.000000 
2005M02 7.600000 6.902727 91720223 137.2600 70557369 1.000000 
2005M03 7.600000 5.683212 87918202 135.9200 71517220 1.000000 
2005M04 7.600000 4.740345 74485553 135.7600 72447584 1.000000 
2005M05 7.600000 5.047005 70907276 132.4400 73352077 1.000000 
2005M06 7.600000 4.732136 70097918 130.9100 74234460 1.000000 
2005M07 7.500000 4.311475 77530186 129.4600 75098323 1.000000 
2005M08 7.400000 4.702966 78154133 130.4600 75946969 1.000000 
2005M09 6.600000 3.726638 77442467 129.7100 76783870 1.000000 
2005M10 6.600000 3.078059 71988438 128.0400 77612650 1.000000 
2005M11 6.500000 3.383240 71160609 125.3800 78436979 1.000000 
2005M12 6.500000 3.147965 71552229 125.4900 79260139 1.000000 
2006M01 6.400000 3.439875 75361673 126.1600 80084904 1.000000 
2006M02 6.100000 3.978373 76543412 125.6100 80913513 1.000000 
2006M03 6.200000 3.659037 77295820 126.5100 81747878 1.000000 
2006M04 6.200000 4.376750 75627212 127.9100 82589607 1.000000 
2006M05 5.900000 5.394632 77014721 129.2900 83439999 1.000000 
2006M06 5.900000 7.259240 79466663 126.1700 84299868 1.000000 
2006M07 5.900000 8.413265 86306559 124.4300 85169586 1.000000 
2006M08 5.900000 8.910243 88394725 123.9600 86049183 1.000000 
2006M09 5.900000 9.530787 89054682 121.6100 86938775 1.000000 
2006M10 5.900000 11.79900 85569418 118.0200 87838634 1.000000 
2006M11 6.000000 12.14564 85410716 119.0200 88749185 1.000000 
2006M12 5.900000 12.42737 85861566 118.7000 89670691 1.000000 
2007M01 6.100000 12.29106 87624419 116.8000 90603186 1.000000 
2007M02 6.200000 12.57798 88767530 117.9600 91546438 1.000000 
2007M03 6.200000 12.78162 89993352 118.6000 92500008 1.000000 
2007M04 6.200000 11.47932 91397959 119.3100 93463266 1.000000 
2007M05 6.200000 9.885497 92717148 119.3800 94435404 1.000000 
2007M06 6.100000 8.430162 94046993 119.2100 95415475 1.000000 
2007M07 6.100000 7.619987 94532233 118.9800 96402410 1.000000 
2007M08 6.100000 7.942455 96524833 118.4200 97395045 1.000000 
2007M09 6.000000 9.145284 99169533 116.2400 98392088 1.000000 
2007M10 6.000000 7.342648 1.02E+08 114.6900 99392185 1.000000 
2007M11 6.000000 6.654368 1.06E+08 117.5300 1.00E+08 1.000000 
2007M12 6.000000 6.711510 1.11E+08 115.9600 1.01E+08 1.000000 
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Figure 1: CPI inflation rate (y-on-y) and 3-month deposit rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Industrial production (actual and hp-trended) series 
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Figure 3: Nominal Exchange rate and REER Movements 
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Testing for stationarity: using both the Correlogram, and the Augmented Dickey 
Fuller (ADF) test. 
1- CPI inflation rate: 
Date: 11/13/08   Time: 11:12   
Sample: 1997M01 2007M12   
Included observations: 132   
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation  AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob 
       .|********        .|******** 1 0.977 0.977 128.88 0.000 
       .|*******|     ****|.      | 2 0.933 -0.472 247.34 0.000 
       .|*******|        *|.      | 3 0.876 -0.145 352.46 0.000 
       .|****** |        *|.      | 4 0.805 -0.187 442.08 0.000 
       .|****** |        .|*      | 5 0.732 0.116 516.76 0.000 
       .|*****  |       **|.      | 6 0.651 -0.251 576.27 0.000 
       .|****   |        *|.      | 7 0.563 -0.068 621.13 0.000 
       .|****   |        .|.      | 8 0.475 0.022 653.27 0.000 
       .|***    |        *|.      | 9 0.383 -0.114 674.31 0.000 
       .|**     |        .|*      | 10 0.294 0.086 686.83 0.000 
       .|**     |        .|*      | 11 0.214 0.079 693.50 0.000 
       .|*      |        .|*      | 12 0.142 0.085 696.48 0.000 
       .|*      |        .|**     | 13 0.091 0.319 697.71 0.000 
       .|.      |        *|.      | 14 0.052 -0.145 698.12 0.000 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 15 0.021 -0.016 698.18 0.000 
       .|.      |        .|*      | 16 0.004 0.079 698.19 0.000 
       .|.      |        .|*      | 17 -0.002 0.126 698.19 0.000 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 18 0.003 -0.052 698.19 0.000 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 19 0.019 -0.026 698.24 0.000 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 20 0.042 0.023 698.52 0.000 
       .|*      |        .|*      | 21 0.074 0.092 699.40 0.000 
       .|*      |        .|.      | 22 0.112 -0.030 701.42 0.000 
       .|*      |        .|.      | 23 0.150 -0.023 705.08 0.000 
       .|*      |        .|*      | 24 0.194 0.171 711.21 0.000 
       .|**     |        .|.      | 25 0.236 0.033 720.40 0.000 
       .|**     |       **|.      | 26 0.272 -0.215 732.71 0.000 
       .|**     |        *|.      | 27 0.302 -0.109 748.04 0.000 
       .|**     |        .|.      | 28 0.320 -0.023 765.43 0.000 
       .|**     |        *|.      | 29 0.325 -0.062 783.55 0.000 
       .|**     |        .|.      | 30 0.324 0.062 801.72 0.000 
       .|**     |        .|.      | 31 0.316 0.045 819.19 0.000 
       .|**     |        .|*      | 32 0.304 0.083 835.50 0.000 
       .|**     |        .|.      | 33 0.285 -0.038 850.01 0.000 
       .|**     |        .|.      | 34 0.257 -0.037 861.94 0.000 
       .|**     |        .|.      | 35 0.224 -0.006 871.09 0.000 
       .|*      |        .|.      | 36 0.183 0.008 877.28 0.000 
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Null Hypothesis: CPI has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 5 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=12) 
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.939326  0.0132 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.032498  
 5% level  -3.445877  
 10% level  -3.147878  
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(CPI)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 11/13/08   Time: 11:20   
Sample (adjusted): 1997M07 2007M12  
Included observations: 126 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
CPI(-1) -0.086869 0.022052 -3.939326 0.0001 
D(CPI(-1)) 0.460318 0.084715 5.433692 0.0000 
D(CPI(-2)) 0.028585 0.092367 0.309476 0.7575 
D(CPI(-3)) 0.184869 0.097616 1.893833 0.0607 
D(CPI(-4)) -0.163026 0.103426 -1.576252 0.1176 
D(CPI(-5)) 0.319562 0.094802 3.370845 0.0010 
C 0.143718 0.111540 1.288490 0.2001 
@TREND(1997M01) 0.004469 0.001790 2.496274 0.0139 
R-squared 0.367923     Mean dependent var 0.015515 
Adjusted R-squared 0.330426     S.D. dependent var 0.681564 
S.E. of regression 0.557707     Akaike info criterion 1.731421 
Sum squared resid 36.70238     Schwarz criterion 1.911502 
Log likelihood -101.0795     F-statistic 9.812283 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.024407     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
Referring to the above results, it seems that at 95 percent level of confidence, the CPI inflation rate series is stationary 
(Integrated of order zero “I(0)”). 
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2- 3-month deposit rate: 
 
Date: 11/13/08   Time: 11:34   
Sample: 1997M01 2007M12   
Included observations: 132   
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation  AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob 
       .|*******|        .|*******| 1 0.975 0.975 128.43 0.000 
       .|*******|        .|.      | 2 0.952 0.017 251.73 0.000 
       .|*******|        .|.      | 3 0.927 -0.035 369.68 0.000 
       .|*******|        .|.      | 4 0.903 -0.023 482.26 0.000 
       .|*******|        .|.      | 5 0.877 -0.030 589.33 0.000 
       .|*******|        .|.      | 6 0.853 0.023 691.45 0.000 
       .|****** |        .|.      | 7 0.829 -0.012 788.66 0.000 
       .|****** |        .|.      | 8 0.807 0.028 881.52 0.000 
       .|****** |        *|.      | 9 0.782 -0.061 969.53 0.000 
       .|****** |        .|.      | 10 0.760 0.021 1053.2 0.000 
       .|****** |        .|.      | 11 0.736 -0.036 1132.4 0.000 
       .|*****  |        .|.      | 12 0.711 -0.034 1207.0 0.000 
       .|*****  |        *|.      | 13 0.684 -0.061 1276.6 0.000 
       .|*****  |        .|.      | 14 0.658 -0.008 1341.4 0.000 
       .|*****  |        *|.      | 15 0.629 -0.063 1401.2 0.000 
       .|*****  |        .|.      | 16 0.600 -0.013 1456.1 0.000 
       .|****   |        .|.      | 17 0.574 0.046 1506.8 0.000 
       .|****   |        .|.      | 18 0.549 -0.013 1553.5 0.000 
       .|****   |        *|.      | 19 0.520 -0.094 1595.7 0.000 
       .|****   |        .|.      | 20 0.491 -0.017 1633.8 0.000 
       .|****   |        .|*      | 21 0.468 0.097 1668.7 0.000 
       .|***    |        .|.      | 22 0.444 -0.032 1700.4 0.000 
       .|***    |        *|.      | 23 0.415 -0.116 1728.3 0.000 
       .|***    |        .|*      | 24 0.392 0.109 1753.4 0.000 
       .|***    |        .|.      | 25 0.369 -0.022 1775.9 0.000 
       .|***    |        *|.      | 26 0.343 -0.071 1795.6 0.000 
       .|**     |        .|.      | 27 0.319 0.020 1812.7 0.000 
       .|**     |        .|.      | 28 0.296 0.002 1827.6 0.000 
       .|**     |        .|*      | 29 0.280 0.141 1841.1 0.000 
       .|**     |        .|.      | 30 0.268 0.065 1853.5 0.000 
       .|**     |        .|.      | 31 0.254 -0.039 1864.8 0.000 
       .|**     |        .|.      | 32 0.240 -0.048 1875.0 0.000 
       .|**     |        *|.      | 33 0.222 -0.097 1883.8 0.000 
       .|**     |        .|*      | 34 0.207 0.070 1891.6 0.000 
       .|*      |        *|.      | 35 0.190 -0.076 1898.1 0.000 
       .|*      |        .|.      | 36 0.172 -0.026 1903.6 0.000 
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Date: 11/13/08   Time: 11:34   
Sample: 1997M01 2007M12   
Included observations: 131   
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation  AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob 
      **|.      |       **|.      | 1 -0.200 -0.200 5.3721 0.020 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 2 0.040 0.000 5.5914 0.061 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 3 0.017 0.026 5.6295 0.131 
       .|*      |        .|*      | 4 0.101 0.114 7.0253 0.135 
       *|.      |        .|.      | 5 -0.083 -0.044 7.9729 0.158 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 6 -0.003 -0.036 7.9740 0.240 
       *|.      |        *|.      | 7 -0.096 -0.114 9.2704 0.234 
       .|*      |        .|*      | 8 0.176 0.141 13.665 0.091 
       *|.      |        .|.      | 9 -0.122 -0.045 15.779 0.072 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 10 0.056 0.030 16.229 0.093 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 11 -0.019 -0.002 16.280 0.131 
       .|.      |        *|.      | 12 -0.042 -0.089 16.544 0.168 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 13 0.050 0.059 16.915 0.203 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 14 0.013 0.023 16.940 0.259 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 15 -0.006 0.036 16.946 0.322 
       *|.      |        *|.      | 16 -0.140 -0.186 19.904 0.225 
       .|*      |        .|.      | 17 0.086 0.045 21.024 0.225 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 18 -0.014 -0.006 21.056 0.277 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 19 -0.018 0.002 21.106 0.331 
       *|.      |        .|.      | 20 -0.069 -0.029 21.859 0.348 
       .|*      |        .|.      | 21 0.069 -0.007 22.617 0.365 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 22 0.009 0.038 22.630 0.423 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 23 -0.026 -0.049 22.742 0.476 
       .|.      |        .|*      | 24 0.024 0.093 22.832 0.530 
       .|*      |        .|.      | 25 0.075 0.033 23.759 0.533 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 26 -0.030 0.010 23.910 0.581 
       *|.      |        *|.      | 27 -0.105 -0.151 25.766 0.532 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 28 0.063 0.022 26.444 0.549 
      **|.      |       **|.      | 29 -0.189 -0.190 32.545 0.296 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 30 0.046 0.011 32.903 0.327 
       .|.      |        .|*      | 31 0.016 0.078 32.948 0.372 
       .|**     |        .|**     | 32 0.233 0.253 42.494 0.102 
       *|.      |        .|.      | 33 -0.132 -0.020 45.570 0.071 
       .|*      |        .|.      | 34 0.094 0.005 47.143 0.066 
       *|.      |        *|.      | 35 -0.059 -0.074 47.771 0.074 
       .|*      |        .|.      | 36 0.114 -0.001 50.165 0.059 
 
 
 
 
 68
 
Null Hypothesis: _M_DEPOSIT has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=12) 
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.904820  0.6464 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.029595  
 5% level  -3.444487  
 10% level  -3.147063  
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(_M_DEPOSIT)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 11/13/08   Time: 11:37   
Sample (adjusted): 1997M02 2007M12  
Included observations: 131 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
_M_DEPOSIT(-1) -0.051314 0.026939 -1.904820 0.0590 
C 0.528468 0.284658 1.856503 0.0657 
@TREND(1997M01) -0.001945 0.000955 -2.036342 0.0438 
R-squared 0.031491     Mean dependent var -0.029771 
Adjusted R-squared 0.016358     S.D. dependent var 0.172434 
S.E. of regression 0.171018     Akaike info criterion -0.671465 
Sum squared resid 3.743621     Schwarz criterion -0.605621 
Log likelihood 46.98098     F-statistic 2.080925 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.339649     Prob(F-statistic) 0.129017 
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Null Hypothesis: D(_M_DEPOSIT) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=12) 
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -13.95904  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.481217  
 5% level  -2.883753  
 10% level  -2.578694  
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(_M_DEPOSIT,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 11/13/08   Time: 11:37   
Sample (adjusted): 1997M03 2007M12  
Included observations: 130 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
D(_M_DEPOSIT(-1)) -1.200268 0.085985 -13.95904 0.0000 
C -0.037546 0.015048 -2.495157 0.0139 
R-squared 0.603537     Mean dependent var -0.001538 
Adjusted R-squared 0.600440     S.D. dependent var 0.267408 
S.E. of regression 0.169031     Akaike info criterion -0.702204 
Sum squared resid 3.657150     Schwarz criterion -0.658088 
Log likelihood 47.64326     F-statistic 194.8548 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.007741     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
Referring to the above results, it seems that at 95 percent level of confidence, the 3-month deposit rate series is non-
stationary (Integrated of order one” I(1)”). 
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3- Real Effective Exchange rate (REER): 
 
Date: 11/28/08   Time: 13:47   
Sample: 1997M01 2007M12   
Included observations: 132   
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation  AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob 
       .|********        .|******** 1 0.990 0.990 132.42 0.000 
       .|********        *|.      | 2 0.977 -0.187 262.34 0.000 
       .|*******|        *|.      | 3 0.962 -0.068 389.28 0.000 
       .|*******|        *|.      | 4 0.945 -0.101 512.68 0.000 
       .|*******|        *|.      | 5 0.926 -0.078 632.05 0.000 
       .|*******|        .|.      | 6 0.906 0.001 747.27 0.000 
       .|*******|        .|.      | 7 0.886 -0.015 858.27 0.000 
       .|*******|        .|.      | 8 0.865 0.001 965.04 0.000 
       .|****** |        *|.      | 9 0.842 -0.146 1067.0 0.000 
       .|****** |        *|.      | 10 0.817 -0.095 1163.7 0.000 
       .|****** |        .|.      | 11 0.790 -0.033 1254.9 0.000 
       .|****** |        *|.      | 12 0.761 -0.091 1340.4 0.000 
       .|****** |        .|*      | 13 0.733 0.093 1420.3 0.000 
       .|*****  |        *|.      | 14 0.704 -0.074 1494.6 0.000 
       .|*****  |        .|*      | 15 0.676 0.066 1563.7 0.000 
       .|*****  |        .|.      | 16 0.648 -0.041 1627.6 0.000 
       .|*****  |        *|.      | 17 0.617 -0.162 1686.1 0.000 
       .|****   |        *|.      | 18 0.583 -0.111 1738.9 0.000 
       .|****   |        .|.      | 19 0.549 -0.029 1786.0 0.000 
       .|****   |        .|.      | 20 0.513 -0.005 1827.6 0.000 
       .|****   |        .|*      | 21 0.479 0.115 1864.3 0.000 
       .|***    |        *|.      | 22 0.445 -0.079 1896.0 0.000 
       .|***    |        .|*      | 23 0.412 0.087 1923.5 0.000 
       .|***    |        .|.      | 24 0.380 -0.057 1947.1 0.000 
       .|***    |        .|*      | 25 0.349 0.087 1967.3 0.000 
       .|**     |        .|.      | 26 0.319 -0.042 1984.3 0.000 
       .|**     |        .|.      | 27 0.288 -0.039 1998.3 0.000 
       .|**     |        .|.      | 28 0.257 -0.037 2009.5 0.000 
       .|**     |        .|.      | 29 0.225 -0.025 2018.2 0.000 
       .|*      |        .|.      | 30 0.195 0.025 2024.8 0.000 
       .|*      |        .|.      | 31 0.165 0.017 2029.5 0.000 
       .|*      |        *|.      | 32 0.136 -0.059 2032.8 0.000 
       .|*      |        .|.      | 33 0.107 -0.052 2034.9 0.000 
       .|*      |        .|.      | 34 0.079 -0.023 2036.0 0.000 
       .|.      |        .|*      | 35 0.052 0.097 2036.5 0.000 
       .|.      |        *|.      | 36 0.024 -0.110 2036.6 0.000 
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Date: 11/28/08   Time: 13:48   
Sample: 1997M01 2007M12   
Included observations: 131   
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation  AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob 
       .|*      |        .|*      | 1 0.155 0.155 3.2344 0.072 
       .|*      |        .|*      | 2 0.107 0.085 4.7693 0.092 
       .|*      |        .|*      | 3 0.109 0.084 6.3950 0.094 
       .|*      |        .|*      | 4 0.099 0.066 7.7316 0.102 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 5 0.026 -0.013 7.8241 0.166 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 6 0.022 -0.002 7.8904 0.246 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 7 0.009 -0.010 7.9011 0.341 
       .|*      |        .|*      | 8 0.140 0.137 10.668 0.221 
       .|*      |        .|*      | 9 0.126 0.094 12.919 0.166 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 10 0.061 0.013 13.446 0.200 
       .|*      |        .|*      | 11 0.117 0.074 15.434 0.163 
       .|.      |        *|.      | 12 -0.048 -0.123 15.766 0.202 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 13 0.058 0.047 16.261 0.235 
       .|.      |        *|.      | 14 -0.045 -0.072 16.567 0.280 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 15 -0.017 -0.003 16.607 0.343 
       .|*      |        .|*      | 16 0.121 0.140 18.836 0.277 
       .|*      |        .|*      | 17 0.138 0.093 21.746 0.195 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 18 0.035 -0.013 21.930 0.235 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 19 0.039 -0.041 22.161 0.276 
       *|.      |        *|.      | 20 -0.073 -0.132 22.999 0.289 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 21 0.054 0.063 23.456 0.320 
       *|.      |        *|.      | 22 -0.094 -0.103 24.861 0.304 
       *|.      |        .|.      | 23 -0.058 0.028 25.401 0.330 
       *|.      |        *|.      | 24 -0.090 -0.106 26.731 0.317 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 25 -0.004 0.004 26.734 0.369 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 26 0.017 0.009 26.780 0.421 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 27 0.033 0.009 26.964 0.466 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 28 -0.027 0.002 27.083 0.514 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 29 -0.038 -0.041 27.327 0.554 
       *|.      |        .|.      | 30 -0.065 -0.051 28.064 0.567 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 31 -0.054 0.029 28.567 0.592 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 32 0.012 0.022 28.590 0.640 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 33 -0.054 -0.000 29.113 0.661 
       *|.      |        *|.      | 34 -0.075 -0.124 30.121 0.658 
       .|.      |        .|*      | 35 0.039 0.096 30.398 0.690 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 36 0.002 -0.013 30.399 0.732 
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Null Hypothesis: REER_EGYPT__CPI has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=12) 
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.380165  0.8624 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.029595  
 5% level  -3.444487  
 10% level  -3.147063  
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(REER_EGYPT__CPI)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 11/28/08   Time: 13:49   
Sample (adjusted): 1997M02 2007M12  
Included observations: 131 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
REER_EGYPT__CPI(-1) -0.024874 0.018023 -1.380165 0.1699 
C 1.919762 1.530559 1.254288 0.2120 
@TREND(1997M01) 0.013128 0.011184 1.173805 0.2427 
R-squared 0.015019     Mean dependent var 0.063740 
Adjusted R-squared -0.000372     S.D. dependent var 3.222680 
S.E. of regression 3.223278     Akaike info criterion 5.201309 
Sum squared resid 1329.859     Schwarz criterion 5.267154 
Log likelihood -337.6858     F-statistic 0.975855 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.456259     Prob(F-statistic) 0.379656 
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Null Hypothesis: D(REER_EGYPT__CPI) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=12) 
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -10.92822  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.481217  
 5% level  -2.883753  
 10% level  -2.578694  
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(REER_EGYPT__CPI,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 11/28/08   Time: 13:50   
Sample (adjusted): 1997M03 2007M12  
Included observations: 130 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
D(REER_EGYPT__CPI(-1)) -0.844499 0.077277 -10.92822 0.0000 
C 0.181826 0.248860 0.730636 0.4663 
R-squared 0.482674     Mean dependent var 0.117385 
Adjusted R-squared 0.478632     S.D. dependent var 3.928558 
S.E. of regression 2.836647     Akaike info criterion 4.938387 
Sum squared resid 1029.960     Schwarz criterion 4.982503 
Log likelihood -318.9952     F-statistic 119.4261 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.963008     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
Referring to the above results, it seems that at 95 percent level of confidence, the real effective exchange rate series is non-
stationary (Integrated of order one” I(1)”). 
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4- Industrial production: 
 
Date: 11/28/08   Time: 13:41   
Sample: 1997M01 2007M12   
Included observations: 132   
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation  AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob 
       .|*******|        .|*******| 1 0.967 0.967 126.16 0.000 
       .|*******|        *|.      | 2 0.930 -0.059 243.97 0.000 
       .|*******|        .|.      | 3 0.896 0.007 354.02 0.000 
       .|*******|        .|*      | 4 0.870 0.109 458.56 0.000 
       .|*******|        .|.      | 5 0.848 0.041 558.68 0.000 
       .|****** |        .|.      | 6 0.828 0.019 654.90 0.000 
       .|****** |        .|.      | 7 0.806 -0.029 746.79 0.000 
       .|****** |        .|.      | 8 0.783 -0.009 834.22 0.000 
       .|****** |        .|.      | 9 0.759 -0.018 917.04 0.000 
       .|****** |        .|.      | 10 0.734 -0.036 995.08 0.000 
       .|*****  |        .|.      | 11 0.709 -0.005 1068.6 0.000 
       .|*****  |        .|.      | 12 0.687 0.014 1138.1 0.000 
       .|*****  |        .|.      | 13 0.670 0.060 1204.8 0.000 
       .|*****  |        .|.      | 14 0.654 0.007 1269.0 0.000 
       .|*****  |        .|.      | 15 0.638 -0.014 1330.4 0.000 
       .|*****  |        *|.      | 16 0.615 -0.084 1388.1 0.000 
       .|*****  |        .|.      | 17 0.591 -0.015 1441.8 0.000 
       .|****   |        .|.      | 18 0.568 -0.001 1491.8 0.000 
       .|****   |        .|.      | 19 0.551 0.061 1539.2 0.000 
       .|****   |        .|.      | 20 0.535 -0.010 1584.4 0.000 
       .|****   |        .|.      | 21 0.519 -0.023 1627.3 0.000 
       .|****   |        *|.      | 22 0.498 -0.063 1667.2 0.000 
       .|****   |        .|.      | 23 0.476 -0.012 1704.0 0.000 
       .|***    |        .|.      | 24 0.455 0.003 1737.9 0.000 
       .|***    |        .|.      | 25 0.438 0.048 1769.7 0.000 
       .|***    |        .|.      | 26 0.423 -0.004 1799.5 0.000 
       .|***    |        .|.      | 27 0.407 -0.022 1827.4 0.000 
       .|***    |        *|.      | 28 0.387 -0.082 1852.8 0.000 
       .|***    |        .|.      | 29 0.365 -0.026 1875.6 0.000 
       .|***    |        .|.      | 30 0.342 -0.015 1896.0 0.000 
       .|**     |        .|.      | 31 0.325 0.060 1914.4 0.000 
       .|**     |        .|.      | 32 0.306 -0.032 1931.0 0.000 
       .|**     |        *|.      | 33 0.286 -0.058 1945.6 0.000 
       .|**     |        *|.      | 34 0.257 -0.170 1957.5 0.000 
       .|**     |        *|.      | 35 0.224 -0.072 1966.7 0.000 
       .|*      |        *|.      | 36 0.189 -0.058 1973.3 0.000 
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Date: 11/28/08   Time: 13:43   
Sample: 1997M01 2007M12   
Included observations: 131   
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation  AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob 
       .|***    |        .|***    | 1 0.423 0.423 23.945 0.000 
       .|.      |        *|.      | 2 0.065 -0.138 24.516 0.000 
    ****|.      |     ****|.      | 3 -0.487 -0.571 56.810 0.000 
      **|.      |        .|***    | 4 -0.209 0.405 62.775 0.000 
       *|.      |        *|.      | 5 -0.082 -0.075 63.710 0.000 
       .|*      |      ***|.      | 6 0.133 -0.352 66.188 0.000 
       .|*      |        .|****   | 7 0.094 0.460 67.424 0.000 
       .|*      |        .|.      | 8 0.098 -0.052 68.795 0.000 
       .|*      |        *|.      | 9 0.126 -0.143 71.047 0.000 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 10 -0.033 -0.028 71.201 0.000 
       *|.      |        *|.      | 11 -0.144 -0.104 74.224 0.000 
     ***|.      |        *|.      | 12 -0.331 -0.098 90.294 0.000 
       *|.      |        .|*      | 13 -0.120 0.073 92.421 0.000 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 14 0.015 -0.040 92.455 0.000 
       .|**     |        .|.      | 15 0.251 0.007 101.93 0.000 
       .|*      |        *|.      | 16 0.088 -0.063 103.09 0.000 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 17 0.001 -0.022 103.09 0.000 
       *|.      |        .|.      | 18 -0.184 -0.024 108.29 0.000 
       .|.      |        .|**     | 19 -0.011 0.273 108.31 0.000 
       .|*      |        .|.      | 20 0.084 0.039 109.41 0.000 
       .|**     |        .|.      | 21 0.260 0.044 120.10 0.000 
       .|*      |        *|.      | 22 0.085 -0.112 121.26 0.000 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 23 -0.022 -0.035 121.33 0.000 
      **|.      |        .|.      | 24 -0.197 -0.004 127.65 0.000 
       *|.      |        *|.      | 25 -0.106 -0.077 129.50 0.000 
       *|.      |        .|.      | 26 -0.057 -0.004 130.05 0.000 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 27 0.034 0.024 130.25 0.000 
       .|.      |        *|.      | 28 0.032 -0.084 130.42 0.000 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 29 0.037 -0.013 130.65 0.000 
       .|.      |        *|.      | 30 0.024 -0.067 130.75 0.000 
       .|.      |        .|*      | 31 -0.038 0.124 130.99 0.000 
       *|.      |        .|.      | 32 -0.071 0.039 131.87 0.000 
       *|.      |        .|.      | 33 -0.090 0.043 133.30 0.000 
       .|.      |        *|.      | 34 0.001 -0.074 133.30 0.000 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 35 0.058 0.008 133.91 0.000 
       .|*      |        .|*      | 36 0.134 0.118 137.20 0.000 
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Null Hypothesis: IP has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 7 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=12) 
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.884147  0.6568 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.033727  
 5% level  -3.446464  
 10% level  -3.148223  
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(IP)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 11/28/08   Time: 13:43   
Sample (adjusted): 1997M09 2007M12  
Included observations: 124 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
IP(-1) -0.036077 0.019148 -1.884147 0.0621 
D(IP(-1)) 0.835132 0.081819 10.20712 0.0000 
D(IP(-2)) 0.126576 0.090178 1.403620 0.1632 
D(IP(-3)) -1.223829 0.091086 -13.43596 0.0000 
D(IP(-4)) 0.977535 0.117870 8.293324 0.0000 
D(IP(-5)) 0.078208 0.089859 0.870343 0.3859 
D(IP(-6)) -0.687268 0.089990 -7.637146 0.0000 
D(IP(-7)) 0.506684 0.082161 6.166940 0.0000 
C -6018.176 338850.8 -0.017761 0.9859 
@TREND(1997M01) 30252.67 12948.13 2.336450 0.0212 
R-squared 0.729514     Mean dependent var 708804.7 
Adjusted R-squared 0.708159     S.D. dependent var 3123275. 
S.E. of regression 1687264.     Akaike info criterion 31.59232 
Sum squared resid 3.25E+14     Schwarz criterion 31.81976 
Log likelihood -1948.724     F-statistic 34.16256 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.930754     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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Null Hypothesis: D(IP) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 6 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=12) 
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.915017  0.0465 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.483751  
 5% level  -2.884856  
 10% level  -2.579282  
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(IP,2)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 11/28/08   Time: 13:44   
Sample (adjusted): 1997M09 2007M12  
Included observations: 124 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
D(IP(-1)) -0.425390 0.145930 -2.915017 0.0043 
D(IP(-1),2) 0.268005 0.124434 2.153789 0.0333 
D(IP(-2),2) 0.373775 0.124527 3.001551 0.0033 
D(IP(-3),2) -0.878868 0.125827 -6.984714 0.0000 
D(IP(-4),2) 0.117033 0.081230 1.440762 0.1523 
D(IP(-5),2) 0.188167 0.081611 2.305665 0.0229 
D(IP(-6),2) -0.513173 0.082005 -6.257846 0.0000 
C 319696.2 178581.8 1.790195 0.0760 
R-squared 0.750372     Mean dependent var 36895.90 
Adjusted R-squared 0.735308     S.D. dependent var 3339078. 
S.E. of regression 1717897.     Akaike info criterion 31.61344 
Sum squared resid 3.42E+14     Schwarz criterion 31.79539 
Log likelihood -1952.033     F-statistic 49.81295 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.912889     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
Referring to the above results, it seems that at 95 percent level of confidence, the industrial production series is non-
stationary (Integrated of order one” I(1)”). 
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Table 2- Closed economy Un-structural VAR output 
 Vector Autoregression Estimates  
 Date: 02/27/09   Time: 14:15  
 Sample (adjusted): 1997M09 2007M12 
 Included observations: 124 after adjustments 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
 I CPI YGAP 
I(-1)  0.742146 -0.085746  885422.0 
  (0.09806)  (0.27917)  (856296.) 
 [ 7.56867] [-0.30715] [ 1.03401] 
    
I(-2)  0.187949 -0.205538 -744019.4 
  (0.12187)  (0.34697)  (1064282) 
 [ 1.54219] [-0.59238] [-0.69908] 
    
I(-3)  0.121455 -0.209924  878784.4 
  (0.12239)  (0.34845)  (1068807) 
 [ 0.99236] [-0.60246] [ 0.82221] 
    
I(-4)  0.068697  0.160933 -812807.6 
  (0.12169)  (0.34645)  (1062685) 
 [ 0.56453] [ 0.46452] [-0.76486] 
    
I(-5) -0.163499  0.281380  189457.8 
  (0.12240)  (0.34849)  (1068932) 
 [-1.33573] [ 0.80743] [ 0.17724] 
    
I(-6) -0.047301  0.209889  15047.73 
  (0.12115)  (0.34492)  (1057997) 
 [-0.39043] [ 0.60851] [ 0.01422] 
    
I(-7) -0.026662 -0.091208  302514.2 
  (0.11973)  (0.34088)  (1045603) 
 [-0.22268] [-0.26756] [ 0.28932] 
    
I(-8)  0.114416 -0.138022 -217045.1 
  (0.09587)  (0.27295)  (837229.) 
 [ 1.19343] [-0.50567] [-0.25924] 
    
CPI(-1)  0.027771  1.207057  618561.7 
  (0.03418)  (0.09731)  (298486.) 
 [ 0.81248] [ 12.4041] [ 2.07233] 
    
CPI(-2) -0.028642 -0.213570 -798840.6 
  (0.05279)  (0.15029)  (460979.) 
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 [-0.54260] [-1.42109] [-1.73292] 
    
CPI(-3)  0.008275  0.153125  667233.6 
  (0.05390)  (0.15344)  (470668.) 
 [ 0.15354] [ 0.99792] [ 1.41763] 
    
CPI(-4) -0.056715 -0.217500 -722292.2 
  (0.05529)  (0.15742)  (482859.) 
 [-1.02572] [-1.38166] [-1.49587] 
    
CPI(-5)  0.077645  0.276085  53029.68 
  (0.05524)  (0.15726)  (482360.) 
 [ 1.40570] [ 1.75563] [ 0.10994] 
    
CPI(-6) -0.069858 -0.202321  180279.1 
  (0.05667)  (0.16135)  (494906.) 
 [-1.23268] [-1.25395] [ 0.36427] 
    
CPI(-7)  0.120274 -0.374708 -77656.41 
  (0.05810)  (0.16541)  (507375.) 
 [ 2.07012] [-2.26530] [-0.15306] 
    
CPI(-8) -0.084812  0.323814  431191.6 
  (0.03924)  (0.11173)  (342703.) 
 [-2.16118] [ 2.89828] [ 1.25821] 
    
YGAP(-1)  5.30E-09 -5.72E-08  1.568297 
  (1.1E-08)  (3.0E-08)  (0.09248) 
 [ 0.50035] [-1.89872] [ 16.9578] 
    
YGAP(-2)  2.34E-10  8.96E-09 -0.528901 
  (1.8E-08)  (5.0E-08)  (0.15427) 
 [ 0.01322] [ 0.17807] [-3.42841] 
    
YGAP(-3)  4.20E-09  2.14E-08 -1.319937 
  (1.6E-08)  (4.6E-08)  (0.14017) 
 [ 0.26195] [ 0.46825] [-9.41692] 
    
YGAP(-4) -3.52E-09 -3.54E-08  1.944946 
  (2.1E-08)  (6.0E-08)  (0.18362) 
 [-0.16758] [-0.59099] [ 10.5920] 
    
YGAP(-5)  5.82E-09  2.56E-08 -0.741205 
  (2.1E-08)  (5.9E-08)  (0.18099) 
 [ 0.28102] [ 0.43433] [-4.09522] 
    
YGAP(-6) -4.37E-09  2.11E-08 -0.820422 
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  (1.6E-08)  (4.6E-08)  (0.14041) 
 [-0.27163] [ 0.46081] [-5.84312] 
    
YGAP(-7) -4.47E-09  1.93E-08  1.086242 
  (1.8E-08)  (5.1E-08)  (0.15517) 
 [-0.25177] [ 0.38214] [ 7.00039] 
    
YGAP(-8)  8.12E-10 -6.62E-08 -0.501480 
  (1.1E-08)  (3.0E-08)  (0.09293) 
 [ 0.07632] [-2.18570] [-5.39642] 
    
C  0.009517  0.890731 -5874837. 
  (0.24420)  (0.69525)  (2132565) 
 [ 0.03897] [ 1.28117] [-2.75482] 
 R-squared  0.986356  0.981658  0.938925 
 Adj. R-squared  0.983048  0.977212  0.924119 
 Sum sq. resids  2.993354  24.26276  2.28E+14 
 S.E. equation  0.173885  0.495054  1518501. 
 F-statistic  298.2018  220.7692  63.41523 
 Log likelihood  54.93261 -74.80536 -1926.909 
 Akaike AIC -0.482784  1.609764  31.48241 
 Schwarz SC  0.085821  2.178369  32.05101 
 Mean dependent  8.256976  5.198762 -14738.57 
 S.D. dependent  1.335528  3.279402  5512509. 
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  1.68E+10  
 Determinant resid covariance  8.56E+09  
 Log likelihood -1945.785  
 Akaike information criterion  32.59331  
 Schwarz criterion  34.29912  
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Table 3: Lag length 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria     
Endogenous variables: I CPI YGAP      
Exogenous variables: C      
Date: 03/21/09   Time: 22:59     
Sample: 1997M01 2007M12     
Included observations: 120     
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 -2510.670 NA   3.14e+14  41.89450  41.96418  41.92280 
1 -2020.791  947.0983  1.04e+11  33.87986  34.15860  33.99306 
2 -1990.988  56.13004  7.35e+10  33.53313   34.02094*  33.73123 
3 -1989.322  3.053256  8.31e+10  33.65537  34.35225  33.93838 
4 -1965.058  43.27230  6.45e+10  33.40096  34.30689  33.76886 
5 -1945.225  34.37609  5.40e+10  33.22042  34.33542  33.67322 
6 -1926.445  31.61292  4.60e+10  33.05742  34.38148  33.59513 
7 -1909.311  27.98574  4.03e+10  32.92185  34.45497  33.54446 
8 -1885.469  37.74986  3.17e+10  32.67448  34.41667   33.38199* 
9 -1877.101  12.83080  3.23e+10  32.68502  34.63626  33.47743 
10 -1863.849   19.65776*   3.04e+10*   32.61415*  34.77445  33.49146 
11 -1858.355  7.873868  3.26e+10  32.67259  35.04196  33.63480 
12 -1854.141  5.829237  3.58e+10  32.75236  35.33079  33.79947 
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 82
Table 4- Open economy Un-structural VAR output 
 Vector Autoregression Estimates   
 Date: 02/27/09   Time: 14:24   
 Sample (adjusted): 1997M03 2007M12  
 Included observations: 130 after adjustments  
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]  
 I CPI YGAP LREER 
I(-1)  0.740336  0.308701  1749274.  0.012564 
  (0.09018)  (0.29063)  (1321301)  (0.01190) 
 [ 8.20930] [ 1.06219] [ 1.32390] [ 1.05556] 
     
I(-2)  0.214779 -0.388932 -1082040.  0.004535 
  (0.09170)  (0.29551)  (1343507)  (0.01210) 
 [ 2.34224] [-1.31613] [-0.80538] [ 0.37466] 
     
CPI(-1)  0.031498  1.246750  261136.5 -0.004476 
  (0.02693)  (0.08679)  (394566.)  (0.00355) 
 [ 1.16963] [ 14.3656] [ 0.66183] [-1.25937] 
     
CPI(-2) -0.021396 -0.293044 -9951.484  0.003315 
  (0.02718)  (0.08760)  (398274.)  (0.00359) 
 [-0.78711] [-3.34515] [-0.02499] [ 0.92386] 
     
YGAP(-1)  1.08E-09 -3.80E-08  1.233349  2.41E-10 
  (5.5E-09)  (1.8E-08)  (0.08008)  (7.2E-10) 
 [ 0.19685] [-2.15812] [ 15.4017] [ 0.33406] 
     
YGAP(-2)  3.22E-09 -9.12E-09 -0.500348 -1.48E-09 
  (5.6E-09)  (1.8E-08)  (0.08168)  (7.4E-10) 
 [ 0.57790] [-0.50739] [-6.12585] [-2.01545] 
     
LREER(-1)  0.160953  1.797362 -6034535.  0.953519 
  (0.59146)  (1.90607)  (8665700)  (0.07806) 
 [ 0.27213] [ 0.94297] [-0.69637] [ 12.2144] 
     
LREER(-2) -0.070385 -0.627939  2536542. -0.063979 
  (0.55584)  (1.79129)  (8143849)  (0.07336) 
 [-0.12663] [-0.35055] [ 0.31147] [-0.87209] 
     
C -0.037505 -4.367806  8575453.  0.340719 
  (0.86972)  (2.80281)  (1.3E+07)  (0.11479) 
 [-0.04312] [-1.55837] [ 0.67298] [ 2.96815] 
     
DV_REER -0.216895 -0.370045  2077591.  0.086597 
  (0.13731)  (0.44249)  (2011744)  (0.01812) 
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 [-1.57963] [-0.83627] [ 1.03273] [ 4.77838] 
 R-squared  0.985657  0.973572  0.806163  0.989877 
 Adj. R-squared  0.984581  0.971590  0.791625  0.989118 
 Sum sq. resids  3.378573  35.08828  7.25E+14  0.058857 
 S.E. equation  0.167794  0.540742  2458414.  0.022147 
 F-statistic  916.2826  491.1769  55.45291  1303.863 
 Log likelihood  52.79326 -99.33363 -2092.213  316.0501 
 Akaike AIC -0.658358  1.682056  32.34173 -4.708462 
 Schwarz SC -0.437778  1.902635  32.56231 -4.487883 
 Mean dependent  8.334346  5.173747  19587.92  4.674777 
 S.D. dependent  1.351308  3.208129  5385577.  0.212304 
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  23062842   
 Determinant resid covariance  16744200   
 Log likelihood -1819.030   
 Akaike information criterion  28.60046   
 Schwarz criterion  29.48277   
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Table 5: Lag length 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria     
Endogenous variables: I CPI YGAP LREER     
Exogenous variables: C DV_REER      
Date: 03/21/09   Time: 23:01     
Sample: 1997M01 2007M12     
Included observations: 120     
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 -2267.104 NA   3.45e+11  37.91841  38.10424  37.99387 
1 -1722.923  1033.944  51868104  29.11539   29.67289*  29.34179 
2 -1689.650  61.00170  38940141  28.82749  29.75666   29.20483* 
3 -1683.393  11.05323  45930820  28.98989  30.29072  29.51816 
4 -1651.630  53.99742  35490693  28.72717  30.39966  29.40637 
5 -1624.396  44.48265  29656483  28.53993  30.58409  29.37007 
6 -1600.864  36.86557  26451236  28.41441  30.83023  29.39549 
7 -1578.606  33.38735  24200844  28.31010  31.09760  29.44212 
8 -1552.448  37.49275  20853963  28.14081  31.29997  29.42376 
9 -1530.458  30.05389  19377548  28.04096  31.57179  29.47485 
10 -1508.956   27.95177*   18279972*   27.94927*  31.85176  29.53409 
11 -1498.058  13.44199  20744856  28.03429  32.30845  29.77005 
12 -1491.019  8.211286  25343346  28.18366  32.82948  30.07034 
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    
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Appendix B: Estimating the Augmented Taylor as exercised in part IV but with using 
the Overnight Interbank rate as a Policy Rate 
 
Using the overnight interbank rate as a policy rate June 2005- December 2007: 
The same exercise performed in part four for estimating the augmented Taylor rule eq. 6, is 
attempted again but with only two different: 
 ………….. (6) 
  
First: the overnight interbank rate is used as the policy rate instead of the 3-month deposits 
rate. 
Second: the sample period is from 2005:06 to 2007:12 instead of 1997:01 to 2007:12. 
 
Table 1: Data description 
Variable Description 
ON Overnight interbank rate - end of month (%)  
CPI Consumer Price Index Inflation rate (y-on-y) (%) 
IP Industrial Production (in million EGP) 
YPOTEN Potential Industrial Production (Output) using hp-trending 
LREER Log Real Effective Exchange rate using CPI (%) 
DV_REER Dummy Variable (DV_REER= 1 starting from 2003:01, and zero otherwise) 
YGAP The output gap ( IP – YPOTEN ) 
 
Table 2: Augmented Taylor Rule estimation output using GMM 
Dependent Variable: D_ON 
Method: Generalized Method of Moments 
Date: 12/23/09   Time: 22:04 
Sample(adjusted): 2005M11 2007M12 
Included observations: 26 after adjusting endpoints 
Kernel: Bartlett,  Bandwidth: Fixed (2),  Prewhitening 
Simultaneous weighting matrix & coefficient iteration 
Convergence achieved after: 90 weight matrices, 91 total coef iterations 
Instrument list: D_ON(-1 TO -4) YGAP(-1 TO -5) D_LREER(-1 TO -5) 
        CPI(-1 TO -5) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
CPI 0.024074 0.001189 20.24970 0.0000 
YGAP 1.15E-08 1.22E-09 9.418394 0.0000 
D_LREER -2.001339 0.346160 -5.781539 0.0000 
DV_REER -0.820231 0.140633 -5.832412 0.0000 
D_ON(-1) 1.064623 0.015416 69.05901 0.0000 
D_LREER(-1) -2.181386 0.410984 -5.307717 0.0000 
R-squared 0.405421     Mean dependent var 8.763462 
Adjusted R-squared 0.256776     S.D. dependent var 0.359510 
S.E. of regression 0.309935     Sum squared resid 1.921198 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.614464     J-statistic 0.290865 
 
ttttttttt ixrxryyri εγγγγππγπ ++∆+∆+−+−++= −− 15143*2*1 )()(*
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Table 2 above; shows the detailed estimation output of equation (6) above using GMM 
estimation technique. 
 
From the above results; although the model gave significant variables with the same 
predetermined theoretical signs (Mohanty and Klau 2004), but with taking into 
consideration the short sample estimation restrictions, this output can't be documented. 
Nevertheless; we still believe that using the overnight interbank rate as a policy rate, while 
estimating Taylor rule for a longer sample, will result in a significant output and a reliable 
interest rate rule.  
 
However; it’s obvious from the R2 that the model explains only about 40 percent from the 
total change in the nominal interest rate53. In addition; some of the coefficients values are 
relatively low, especially the output gap coefficient which is approximately equal to zero. 
This implies that output gap has negligible effect on the nominal interest rate54.  
                                                
53 Compared to R2 with 12 percent in the augmented Taylor rule derived in part four. 
54 Same conclusion as the augmented Taylor rule derived in part four using the 3-month deposit interest rates. 
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Table 3: Data spread sheet 
obs ON CPI LREER IP YPOTEN DV_REER 
2005M06  9.550000  4.732136  130.9100  70097918  74234460  1.000000 
2005M07  9.560000  4.311475  129.4600  77530186  75098323  1.000000 
2005M08  9.710000  4.702966  130.4600  78154133  75946969  1.000000 
2005M09  9.420000  3.726638  129.7100  77442467  76783870  1.000000 
2005M10  9.270000  3.078059  128.0400  71988438  77612650  1.000000 
2005M11  9.170000  3.383240  125.3800  71160609  78436979  1.000000 
2005M12  8.910000  3.147965  125.4900  71552229  79260139  1.000000 
2006M01  8.400000  3.439875  126.1600  75361673  80084904  1.000000 
2006M02  8.530000  3.978373  125.6100  76543412  80913513  1.000000 
2006M03  8.570000  3.659037  126.5100  77295820  81747878  1.000000 
2006M04  8.250000  4.376750  127.9100  75627212  82589607  1.000000 
2006M05  8.190000  5.394632  129.2900  77014721  83439999  1.000000 
2006M06  8.200000  7.259240  126.1700  79466663  84299868  1.000000 
2006M07  8.060000  8.413265  124.4300  86306559  85169586  1.000000 
2006M08  8.680000  8.910243  123.9600  88394725  86049183  1.000000 
2006M09  8.990000  9.530787  121.6100  89054682  86938775  1.000000 
2006M10  9.180000  11.79900  118.0200  85569418  87838634  1.000000 
2006M11  9.590000  12.14564  119.0200  85410716  88749185  1.000000 
2006M12  8.890000  12.42737  118.7000  85861566  89670691  1.000000 
2007M01  9.230000  12.29106  116.8000  87624419  90603186  1.000000 
2007M02  8.810000  12.57798  117.9600  88767530  91546438  1.000000 
2007M03  8.840000  12.78162  118.6000  89993352  92500008  1.000000 
2007M04  8.790000  11.47932  119.3100  91397959  93463266  1.000000 
2007M05  8.760000  9.885497  119.3800  92717148  94435404  1.000000 
2007M06  8.790000  8.430162  119.2100  94046993  95415475  1.000000 
2007M07  8.750000  7.619987  118.9800  94532233  96402410  1.000000 
2007M08  8.750000  7.942455  118.4200  96524833  97395045  1.000000 
2007M09  8.750000  9.145284  116.2400  99169533  98392088  1.000000 
2007M10  8.750000  7.342648  114.6900  1.02E+08  99392185  1.000000 
2007M11  8.750000  6.654368  117.5300  1.06E+08  1.00E+08  1.000000 
2007M12  8.750000  6.711510  115.9600  1.11E+08  1.01E+08  1.000000 
  
